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Abstract 
The 2008 Argentine pension reform represented a new change of paradigm in the country’s 
pension policy. It encompassed the elimination of the fully funded, defined contribution 
(DC), private tier of the so-called Integrated Retirement and Pensions System (SIJP) – a two-
tiered arrangement implemented in 1994 and inspired by the World Bank’s recommendations 
contained in the work Averting the Old Age Crisis (World Bank 1994). And the shift back to 
a publicly managed, single-tiered pension system provided in a pay-as-you-go defined benefit 
(PAYG-DB) basis: the Argentine Integrated Retirement System (SIPA).  
 
In order to finally explain these events, in this thesis I present a detailed account of the events 
that took place in 2008, divided into six chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic, its 
background and the research question: Why did Argentina change its pension system back to 
a one-tiered, pay as you go DB system in 2008? The second explains the appropriateness of 
the research strategy and the design chosen for this study. In the third chapter, the reader is 
introduced to the events under analysis and the possible explanations or “suspects” to be 
explored upon. The fourth chapter provides the framework and settings to understand 
Argentina’s policy making process. Chapter five brings in with detail the sequence of 
decisions that resulted in the shift back to a pay-as-you-go DB public pension design in 
Argentina, connecting them with that group of “suspects” (11 hypotheses) that may explain 
why it happened. Finally, chapter six rounds up and analyses the findings and closes with the 
final conclusions and recommendation for further investigation. 
 
To briefly summarize some of the findings that made possible this shift back to pay-as-you-
go: (a) the effect that changes in public representations of social problems have over the 
sustainability of their associated social arrangements. (b) The transformations in the private-
public mix that have been happening in Argentine society since 2003, and the development of 
a different understanding of role of the State. (c) The multidimensional feature of social 
policy – and in particular pension policy – and the way the various dimensions are prioritized 
and discussed upon during the policy formulation process, leading to a certain “consensual” 
understanding of what the problem is and how it should be solved. (d) The impact that certain 
aspects of political cultures – such as the presence of machine politics or ideology – may 
have over policy and the process of policy change, influencing arguments and final outcomes. 
(e) The shaping role of institutions and electoral results in the whole policy making process. 
(f) The new map of international relationships, in particular with the IMF and the World 
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Bank. (g) And how local and international contexts create certain settings that can affect the 
views of all actors involved.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The discussion around old age care often refers to the economic sustainability of the pension 
system that provides it. However, endurance is not the only important concern. Various 
authors are also worried about the existence of persistent old age poverty together with 
already high levels of pension expenditure that are further increasing. Simultaneously, 
governments have to deal with the pressures of economic globalization that may constraint a 
country’s freedom to design its social security institutions (N. Barr 2006, 1-4; CISS 2010, 77-
80). Pension systems are the largest single welfare arrangement and their redistributional 
potential is very high, making pension policy particularly relevant to different political actors 
(Bonoli 2000, 8-9).  
 
It does not come as a surprise that as a consequence of this scenario the way pension schemes 
are designed has become a central subject to many during the past years. However, regardless 
of the existence of the multiple variables involved, the main supporting argument for reforms 
has remained as the increase in the number of elderly people consequence of the rise in life 
expectancy and falling birth rates (Andersson 2006, 388). This increased demand of a system 
that can cover the needs of the old while being sustainable in the long run has resulted in a 
vast offer of academic papers and a series of pension system reforms focused on technical 
issues such as whether private pensions should be mandatory or voluntary, should have 
defined contributions or defined benefits, or should be funded or pay-as-you-go (N. Barr 
2006; N. Barr 2009; Palacios and Pallarès-Miralles 2000; World Bank 1994).  
 
Up until today, it has been almost always assumed that a reform would be carried out just 
because of technical issues. There is a predominant economic approach that tends to explain 
pension system reforms based on design problems that operate within the arrangement – or 
mix of arrangements – in place. And do not account for the reasons why a particular reform – 
and the definition of the social problem that needs to be solved by the reform – reaches a 
leading position in the political agenda. Under these considerations, the way design problems 
are interpreted and advocated for by the different political actors need to be studied to fully 
understand dramatic changes such as pension system reforms (Goul Andersen 2001, 123-
129). Because political priorities are defined and redefined across time and countries and 
“[…] the policies effectively applied in each country, and the aims underpinning design 
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features, are the result of political compromises and reflect the ideas that prevail at a given 
moment of time as well as the balance of power in the political process” (Arza 2008, 2696).  
 
Thus, this would mean driving attention away from that pure technical debate and towards 
the study of the system’s political sustainability. Looking into the policy process in its 
context and searching for those tradeoffs willing to be accepted and those political 
constituencies willing to accept them in terms of their relative power in that decision making 
process, would provide a more thorough explanation of pension system reforms, their 
implications and the circumstances under which dramatic shifts in social security systems are 
likely to take place.  
 
The Argentine pension system was first put in place in 1904. Its structure was fully funded by 
wage contributions, it provided earnings-related benefits, and it covered public workers - 
being extended from 1920 onwards to the private sector. Despite its original surplus, in 1968 
the system was reformed for the first time into a so called Pay-as-you-go scheme, a scheme 
where benefits were paid out of the current contributions and taxes; in contrast to fully 
funded schemes where payments are done out of funds that would be previously accumulated 
(Gillion, et al. 2000, 710). Due to prominent financial imbalances later once again – in 1980 – 
the scheme began to require extra support from the state through general taxes and other 
government funding. At that time, the system was a publicly managed, defined-benefit (DB) 
scheme, where benefits were calculated upon the “worker’s history of pensionable earnings”. 
Defined-contribution (DC) pension benefits, as an alternative arrangement, are determined by 
the accumulated funds in individual accounts (Barr and Diamond 2009, 8). That PAYG-DB 
scheme that covered formal workers against retirement, disability and death of a provider, 
continued in place until 1994 when the first fundamental shift was performed (Asociación de 
Administradoras Privadas (ASAP) 1998, 89-97).  
 
In 1994 – one and a half years after the first project draft was presented to the congress – 
Argentina replaced the existing scheme with the so-called Integrated Retirement and 
Pensions System (SIJP) (Law 24.241). This was a mixed pension system
1
 that consisted of 
two tiers: (a) a basic PAYG-DB pension provided through a reformed public tier limited to 
reducing old age poverty. (b) A privately managed tier that would provide an earnings-
                                                 
1
 Figure 1 shows how the two-tiered system was organized. See appendix 1 for additional information about 
how the Public/Private mix was organized.   
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related, mandatory, fully funded, defined-contribution scheme, aimed at becoming the bulk of 
the system.  
 
The introduction of this new scheme had a double purpose: provide fiscal, financial and 
economic stability and development, while addressing the pension system’s sustainability 
problems (Arza 2008, 2697). This public-private mix suffered a number of modifications 
throughout its 14 years of existence (Arza 2009, 2), and ended in 2008 when the country 
made what can be labelled as a “U-turn” in pension design, removed the private tier and 
returned to the previous pension model: a single-tiered, public, pay-as-you-go, defined 
benefits pension system. 
 
Institutional division of responsibility – Argentina’s pension system 1994-2008 
Public/Private mix 
 
 
Figure 1 
Source: (Ginneken 2003, 225) 
Ministry of finance 
Private system Public system 
Responsible government department 
 Labour and social security 
 Social security secretariat 
 
National Social Security Board (Tripartite) 
Coordination, general oversight 
Autonomous institution (ANSeS) 
(Executive tripartite board) 
 
Supervisory body 
Private pension funds (AFJPs) 
9 
 
1.2 Research Focus and Questions 
What can explain the 2008 U-turn in Argentine pension policy?  What are the elements and 
dynamics of Argentina’s policy process that allowed the occurrence of this return to a pay-as-
you-go DB pension system? Argentina’s path could be summarized as from PAYG-DB – to 
fully funded-DC – and back to PAYG-DB, showing a clear U-turn figure completed when the 
Argentine Congress passed the bill that would eliminate – and transfer its administration to 
the State – the fully funded-DC tier of the pension system which was put in place in 1994.  
 
The ambition of the study is to understand and explain why this dramatic change took place 
by carefully breaking down the various stages of this policy formulation process. The purpose 
is to explore and identify the possible causes for this peculiar event. In so doing, one may 
hopefully also locate keys to a broader and more general understanding of Argentine social 
policy: how it is conducted and what are crucial factors in understanding the periodic 
occurrence of dramatic social policy changes. Therefore, although meant also to be of general 
relevance in the study of Argentine politics, the research question can be summed up as: Why 
did Argentina change its pension system back to a one-tiered, pay as you go DB system in 
2008? 
 
In addition to throwing light on Argentine policy processes more generally, an answer to this 
question is potentially highly interesting to other countries which – like Argentina – changed 
to privately managed funded pension systems in the 1990s or 2000s, many Latin American as 
well as European countries and some Asian and African countries (Øverbye 2006; Brooks 
2005, 274; Palacios and Pallarès-Miralles 2000; 19). Hence the Argentine experience is not 
only relevant for Argentines, but of interest in a large number of countries that share the 
Argentine experience of shifting to funded pensions in the near past. 
 
2 Methodology 
In this chapter I present the methodology of my study which includes the research design of 
this dissertation, the methods of data collection and data sources, and ends with the 
assumptions and limitations of the study. 
 
2.1 Design 
In an inductive fashion, the research strategy (Yin 1981, 58-59) chosen – a single qualitative 
case study – aims to present first a detailed account of what happened and how it happened. 
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And then, from that starting point, I round up a group of “suspects” (11 hypotheses) that 
arose during the research process and may explain why it happened. Throughout the analysis, 
the arguments concerning the contribution of each hypothesis are investigated in order to 
explain why the process started, how it ran its particular course and to which particular 
outcome (the replacement of mandatory funded pensions with public pay-as-you-go financed 
pensions).  Thus, in order to unveil the answer to the research question I systematically go 
over the sequence of events that took place, trying to decide the relative importance of the 
various hypotheses in explaining what went on, how and why.  In this way, the question of 
“why the U-turn took place” is simultaneously addressed at various theoretical levels; in 
terms of the stated and inferred aims of the various actors who drove the process (both the 
proponents and the opponents), as well as contextual factors (such as the structure of the 
Argentine decision-making system) and situational factors (such as the financial crisis) that 
surrounded their actions. These are presented as two major groups: (1) factors weakening 
those opposing the reform and (2) factors strengthening those advocating for the reform; 
which ultimately resulted in the victory of those who wanted to replace the 1994 funded-type 
system with a redesigned version of the (previous) pay-as-you-go system. 
 
2.2 Data Sources and Data Collection 
The analysis of the events has been based on a combination of primary and secondary 
sources. The first group includes a series of Governmental documents and newspaper articles 
that provided most of the data regarding what and how it happened. The second group – 
mainly scholar articles on the topic – complemented the first in filling in some information 
gaps while providing perspectives and arguments discussed upon to further explain why it 
happened. 
 
From the House of Representatives and Senate websites (www.diputados.gov.ar/ and 
www.senado.gov.ar/), I obtained and analysed the original text to the Bill 26.425 (the 
proposal presented to the Congress), transcripts of the committees meetings and their reports, 
transcripts of the debates and voting held in both chambers of the Argentine Congress, and 
pertinent presentations done to the legislators by various involved actors. In addition, I 
consulted diverse relevant documentation such as the chambers’ rules and regulations, 
articles about the Congress operating guidelines, and the Polylingual Parliamentary Glossary 
developed by the Argentine Congress. From www.infoleg.gov.ar – the Legislative 
Information and Documentation Area (a division of the Documentation and Information 
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Centre of the Ministry of Economy of Argentina) – I obtained the resultant enacted Law 
26.425 – the 2008 Pension System Reform: creation of the Argentine Integrated Retirement 
System (SIPA) – and all related Laws in this paper cited and/or analysed.  Finally, from the 
official website of the Argentine Government (www.argentina.gob.ar/) I obtained the 
Constitution of the Argentine Nation in its English version. 
 
In the analysis I have also included a series of articles from three important Argentine 
newspapers with different political alignment and level of circulation: Clarin (centre/highest 
circulation in the country), La Nación (conservative-right/medium circulation) and Página 12 
(social democrat/low circulation). The search was done reviewing the online versions of these 
newspapers chronologically during the period in which the legislative debate on the pension 
system reform in 2008 took place. While many articles were found and studied in order to 
assess the events free from biases, the list was narrowed down in order to avoid data 
repetition and excessive citation. The main contribution of this source was the illustration of 
the context outside the Congress during the political debate under analysis.  
 
Finally, the literature review included scholar books and journal articles which were, in the 
beginning, selected following a systematic search by topic and core concepts, circumscribed 
to the time and place such as pension reform + Argentina + 2008, and its alternative 
variations using synonyms or associated words such as old age schemes, Pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) pensions, fully funded, defined-benefit schemes/define-contribution schemes, return 
to PAYG, pension politics in Latinamerica, reforms of Bismarkian pension systems. Along 
this search, recommended literature and renown authors on such topics (e.g. Gillion/Mesa 
Lago when it applied to pensions) and the review of most cited authors in the literature found 
(e.g. Levitsky in topics related to Argentine politics) or the abstracts of books and article 
reviews led the process be complemented by a more non-systematic search. The resources 
chosen in this case were websites of specialized organizations like World Bank and CISS, 
online databases and search engines such as Jstor, ISI, E-brary, and Google scholar; and 
generic references as the International Encyclopaedia of Social Policy. In addition, in order to 
increase the available documentation and my own understanding of the concepts and events, I 
performed the same search in Spanish.  
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2.3 Limitations and Assumptions 
The policy making process is usually presented as a simplified process consisting of three 
discrete stages: policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. Likewise, each stage 
could be seen as a system in itself where different actors perform and interact; organized by 
rules and institutions. Ideas emerge, they are negotiated upon, operationalized, implemented 
and finally contrasted against their initial concept, however in a much more fuzzy fashion 
(Bochel and Bochel 2006, 1014). The analysis here is limited to the formulation phase, where 
the ideas are developed into policies. This paper focuses on the series of events that led to the 
approval of the pension reform in Argentina in 2008, starting from its proposal and finishing 
with the legislative process outcome: Law 26.425.  
 
The study is also partially limited by the research strategy chosen. A case study is an in depth 
exploration of one happening. Therefore the results will not be generalizable in its generally 
accepted definition (Chambliss and Schutt 2010, 13), that is, they will not directly apply 
neither to the larger population of Argentine social policies nor to the population of private 
pension system in place in other countries (or other related policies such as the policy mix
2
 
chosen in other countries). However, it does set a precedent in terms of Argentine social 
policy and/or the political sustainability of fully funded, defined-contribution, private pension 
systems, and this should not be disregarded. This thesis is the study of a critical case (Ibid, 
230) that identifies a variety of factors – or combinations of factors – that may potentially 
help explain other political decisions in Argentina’s social policy and similar decisions 
regarding other fully funded, defined-contribution, private pension schemes in other 
countries. Moreover, the case is presented here as a falsification of the understanding that 
private pension schemes are isolated from political manipulation, as it will be discussed 
shortly (section 3.1). Thus suggesting that it is plausible that this happening were repeated in 
other countries that – like Argentina – have changed their systems to a fully funded, defined-
contribution, private pension system (Flybjerg 2006, 224-228). Summing up, this dissertation 
brings in elements that may apply to other happenings but lets the receiver of the information 
determine whether the findings here stated do apply to the new situation under study 
(Kennedy 1979, 672). Luckily, it will also allow the readers to anticipate the possibility – and 
                                                 
2
 A policy mix refers to the combined use of fiscal and monetary policies in a country. With regards to pension 
design it is important to highlight the policy mix will be a variable affecting the financial sustainability of the 
pension system while the design will affect the level of pension spending, the level of savings a country has and 
who has the control over those funds. 
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hence its probability – of similar events happening in other areas of Argentine social policy 
or in other countries.   
 
As regards the data collected, (1) due to limits of time and location, the primary sources 
assessed were only digital documents published online. In the cases in which the data was 
incomplete or inaccurate – and thus not completely reliable – secondary data was used to fill 
in the gaps. (2) Given that much of the information examined was in Spanish, this required 
my interpretation and translation. (3) When dealing with the information gathered from 
newspapers, relevant findings were triangulated with other sources and among the three of 
them selected. This was done in order to avoid biases, lack of validity and incorrect 
information. This triangulation was also performed with regard to some secondary sources 
that had a very explicit biased political discourse.  
 
Finally, the main assumption in this dissertation is that of considering old age care as a social 
problem, in general, and a constitutional social right, in particular to the case of Argentina 
(Sales 2008, 71-74). These conceptions frame the research question and the findings since 
they imply that the reform was an event that took place provided that there was a legitimate 
right that had to be sheltered and a social problem that had to be addressed through the 
appropriate system design. Given that the ultimate goal of the Argentine Constitution is to – 
by all means – provide old age care3 (Constitution of the Argentine Nation, Section 14bis, 2), 
the reform is here regarded in terms of this goal. From that point forward, this study analyses 
the positions of the different actors involved in terms of how they operationalize that goal.   
 
3 What Happened? Searching for possible explanations 
3.1 Pension Reforms and Risks 
A risk refers to a known or estimable probability of future outcomes (N. A. Barr 2002, 2-3). 
In terms of pensions, Gillion et.al (2000) refers to five major sources of risk: (i) Demographic 
risks, including changes in birth rates and post-retirement mortality; (ii) Economic risks 
related to labour market developments, wage growth and investment rate of return and 
inflation; (iii) Political risks associated with the political process involved in pension debate; 
(iv) Institutional risks arising from failure to preserve financial assets, collection problems 
and ineffective administration; and (v) Individual risks consequence of the particular 
                                                 
3
 The topic of the role of the Constitution will be discussed later on. 
14 
 
characteristics of each worker’s career path (301-327). Depending on the system’s design, the 
risk sharing outcome will be different, that is, the dual alternatives private vs. public, pay-as-
you-go vs. funded, mandatory vs. voluntary and defined benefit vs. defined contribution 
categories could be seen as the independent variable determining inter- and intra-generation 
risk allocation (World Bank 1994, 83-87). The issue I will focus in this section refers to the 
degree in which pension system designs can define the level of political risk      
 
Some examples of political risks presented by the World Bank (1994) included: (1) 
governments not fulfilling the promises made to beneficiaries and/or changing the 
arrangements made by previous administrations. Although usually risk reduction or 
neutralization can be achieved through pooling, diversification or it could be shifted to those 
more willing to bear it; in these cases political risk cannot be reduced through risk pooling 
because they are correlated across individuals and subject to moral hazard, but it can be 
neutralized through managerial and financing diversification (84-87). (2) Temptations to 
increase deficit spending without citizens and policymakers being aware of it, given the 
access governments have to larger, cheaper and more flexible reserves than those found in the 
private market (Ibid, 94). (3) Another problem that arises with public systems is that they 
enable influential groups to pressure for designs that benefit them or that are inefficient over 
other groups or future generations (Ibid, 162-163).  
 
The importance of highlighting these examples as a way of defining political risk refers to the 
role of the World Bank behind the promotion of fully funded, defined-contribution, private 
pension systems. Estelle James, author and leader of the World Bank research team that 
wrote the influential report “Averting the Old Age Crisis” assumed that such a system would 
be well isolated from political manipulation. She believed that privately and competitively 
managed funds would reduce the scope for political interference in the future. In her own 
words:  
 
Private management of pension reserves minimizes opportunities for appropriation 
by the government. To be sure, no system is completely immune to the dangers 
described above
4
, and every system will function better if government behaves. But 
the structure we have recommended [mandatory, fully funded-DC pensions managed 
by private institutions] contains checks and balances that place limits on each actor. 
We believe such a system is less susceptible to distortions and more sustainable 
(James 1996, 4, 12-13).  
                                                 
4
 She refers to similar examples of political risks as mentioned in the previous paragraph.  
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Nonetheless, not all scholars have shared James’s view of the virtues of mandatory, funded, 
defined-contribution, private pension systems. Orszag and Stiglitz (2001) claim there is no 
difference regarding exposure to political risk in either of the systems. The regulatory role 
over private schemes provides governments with the same potential ability to interfere in 
comparison with direct public management. Thus, the assumption that inefficient 
governments provide a rationale for switching to funded, defined contribution, private 
pension plans is weakened once one contemplates the possibility that there might be similar 
inefficiencies in how a government regulates and oversees the mandatory private pension 
sector (37). According to Barr (2002) private pension systems are also dependent on well-
functioning governments. In the first place, macroeconomic and fiscal stability is required for 
any pension system – be it public or private – to be sustainable across time. If the 
government’s behaviour is not fiscally prudent, the consequent inflation could de-capitalize 
the private system. Secondly, private systems may create temptations for politicians to 
influence fund managers to hold public debt, with lower rates of return on capital rather than 
other possible investments. Finally, governments may also affect the real return on pension 
funds by withdrawing or reducing tax privileges (17-18). Barr suggests that “political risks 
affect all pension schemes because all depend critically – albeit in different ways – on 
effective government” (N. A. Barr 2002, 3). 
 
Indeed, Estelle James and her colleagues did not account for the possibility of political 
interference by future dramatic re-designs. The 2008 U-turn back from a funded to a pay-as-
you-go based pension system illustrates that mandatory, fully funded, defined-contribution, 
private pensions do not place such “checks and balances” on political actors to the extent that 
they would never interfere to dramatically change pension design again. The questions asked 
here are: Why not? Why has dramatic pension reform been possible also after 1994?  
 
In this regard, Orzag, Stiglitz and Barr’s suggestions represent a starting point in this study. 
The ambition of this dissertation is to understand and explain the dramatic shift in 2008 away 
from a funded and back to pay-as-you-go based system again. Part of the explanation may lie 
in the functioning – and hence level of popularity – of the funded system since its 
introduction in 1994. However the system’s ability to function well was not only dependent 
on which government regulations prevailed in the period 1994-2008, but also on several other 
factors. Furthermore, the shift in 2008 did not necessarily have to do only – or even mainly – 
with the functioning of the 1994 system, but may have been driven by very different factors; 
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including factors related to the critical situation of the Argentine economy at the time the 
switch back to a pay-as-you-go system took place. It is to these many factors we now turn to. 
Through this analysis, the ambition is to throw light not only on why the switch back to a 
pay-as-you-go system took place in Argentina in 2008, but also – hopefully – to approach an 
understanding of under which circumstances dramatic shifts in social security systems are 
likely to take place. 
 
3.2 Outline of the Events 
The U-turn took place during a short period of time. On 21
 October 2008, Argentina’s 
Executive Power presented to the National Congress a piece of legislation to eliminate the 
privately managed, fully funded, defined-contribution pension scheme and unify the multi-
pillar pension system in one only public scheme named Argentine Integrated Retirement 
System (SIPA), and which would be provided on a PAYG-DB basis. This initiated the formal 
process. 
 
Figure 2 below shows – in chronological order – the series of events that took place in 2008. 
The entire legislative process took only 36 days from its presentation day on 21 October until 
it was published in the Official Gazette. By the end of this period the privately managed 
funded tier of the Argentine two-tier pension system was required to be transferred to the 
State. Which were then the circumstances that allowed this dramatic government 
interference, or rather abolishment of a system that – according to Estelle James (above 
quoted) – was supposed to operate within a market economy, isolated from further dramatic 
political interventions? 
 
This dissertation focuses the analysis on the events that occurred during those hectic 36 days 
of legislative process that led to the dramatic U-turn in Argentine pension policy. The 
following section presents a set of 11 hypotheses that may explain this occurrence. These will 
be later on analyzed in-depth (in chapters 5 and section 6.1) in order to address what 
happened, how and why, looking for clues as to which of those hypotheses, and combinations 
thereof, can answer the research question posed in the introduction (“Why did Argentina 
change its pension system back to a one-tiered, pay-as-you-go DB system in 2008?”).  
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Chronological display of the events  
Figure 2  
Source: Own elaboration 
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The analysis goes through the sequence of decisions that resulted in the U-turn – during the 
House of Representatives Committees, House of Representatives floor debate, Senate 
Committees and Senate floor debate –, and the institutional and broader context that 
surrounded those decisions. In order to do so chapter 4 first provides an overview of the how 
the legislative process works in Argentina and the situation of the political parties at the time 
of the reform, framing the events regarding local law and political context. Finally, section 
6.2 closes and concludes remarking recommendations for future research.  
 
3.3 Why Did The Shift Back Take Place?     
3.3.1 Factors weakening those opposing the U-turn 
Perceived Weaknesses of the Previous System – Hypothesis 1 
Together with many other countries in Latin America, Argentina’s reform in 1994 was part of 
a “process in which new policy ideas emerged, gained force among political elites, and were 
advocated as better policy tools” (Arza 2008, 2697). However, these new ideas were so new 
that only little empirical evidence (the Chilean case) was available at that time. The debate 
was therefore carried out mostly at the theoretical level. After fourteen years of its 
implementation, the Argentine society started to realize what the system meant in practice 
while the first set of technical evaluations began to appear, all which gave politicians new 
arguments on the pension debate. Already in 2001 Myles and Pierson stated “Should capital 
markets fail to meet expectations and the living standards of the elderly fall substantially, 
new pressures will emerge for yet another round of reform reminiscent of the 1950s and 
1960s” (331) and yet it could be hypothesized the Argentine U-turn falls into this conception. 
To what extent were those perceptions and new arguments negative and how did those affect 
the continuity of the scheme? A system that is perceived to be working well would not be 
attacked on that basis but defended by those who had an interest on it. Its good reputation 
would be a strong counterforce to stop its reform. By the same token, a bad reputation would 
help those who would like to take it down by weakening the arguments of those opposing the 
reform. 
 
Weak Material Interest Groups – Hypothesis 2 
The beneficiaries of a pension system are the main interest group in the fulfilment of the 
promises made to them during their active life. With the 1994 reform, those “promises” 
transformed from implicit to explicit for those who shifted to the private tier. Pension 
contributions acquired the status of “property right” and the benefits began to depend on each 
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person’s payments to the system (Arza 2008, 2698). Seemingly, the workers – who would 
eventually become beneficiaries – and those who represent them would be expected to resist 
any changes that could jeopardize their interests. Understanding the elimination of the private 
scheme as an indicator of their lack of advocacy and/or representation inside and outside the 
Congress, the hypothesis here states that the affiliates
5
 did not put much effort in trying to 
keep the funded scheme. How much of this is true?     
 
The second material interest group, the Retirement and Pension Funds Administrators 
(AFJPs)
6
, would be expected to advocate for the continuance of the scheme regarding the 
capability of the system to satisfy their economic interests. On these grounds, the degree to 
which these actors would lobby for the design in place – or would even be able to manifest 
their position – should have been of importance in determining the reform’s outcomes. This 
understanding leads to the questions on how strong the private administrators were in the 
political arena, how much they fought back and how they affected the course of the debate. 
 
Weak Political Prestige Stakeholders – Hypothesis 3 
The legislators and political parties that supported reform during the 1993
7
 sessions of the 
Congress would be on the spotlight in 2008. They were the ones who bet on the new 
paradigm and, on that basis, it should be expected some level of consistency in their 
discourses as well as interest in their political reputation regarding the outcomes of the 
funded system. Because even when in the Argentine experience of the multi-pillar 
arrangement, it was the affiliates who were in charge of the decision of actually switching 
schemes
8
 providing they were willing to (Mesa-Lago and Müller 2002, 694-695), the 
accountability to those who believed in that new system would in any case be expected to 
influence the legislators’ standpoints in 2008. Accordingly, we should ask how much political 
prestige they had invested back in 1993/1994 and how this had affected the decisions made in 
2008, underpinned by the idea that political reputation would be of importance to the careers 
of these legislators and their political parties.  
 
 
                                                 
5
 This term includes both current contributors and beneficiaries 
6
 The private social security institutions created by the new system were the operative/executive actors in charge 
of identifying insured people and employers and of the management of contributions, benefits and funds. 
7
 The 1994 reform was approved during the 1993 legislative period. 
8
 For political considerations, a voluntary individual decision brings major support to the reform (Holzmann 
1999, 141), 
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Weak Formal Veto Players – Hypothesis 4 
According to veto points or veto players theory
9
, the legislative process is explained as a 
series of decisions in different areas where the likelihood that a piece of legislation is 
approved or vetoed is framed by the formal constitutional rules and the electoral results 
(Tsebelis 1995, 301-302). This theory considers the institutional setting as one independent 
variable that determines policy outcomes. Any piece of legislation that aims to change the 
status quo will need the agreement of all veto players that the prevailing institutions 
encompass (Tsebelis 2001, 33). A veto player then refers to that actor – individual or 
collective – that has the power (i.e. holds a veto point) to block a project in the decision 
making process. There are two kinds of formal veto players: institutional and partisan. The 
first refers to those actors whose power to veto a bill emerges from the Constitution, while 
the second refers to the parties that are members of a government coalition.  
 
To evaluate the likelihood of approving a change to the status quo, it is necessary to look at 
the level of policy stability
10
 of a country. The latter increases: (a) when the number of 
players a system has increases, thus the higher the number of players the more difficult to 
change the status quo is; (b) when the distance between the policy positions of the players 
increases (i.e. upon the presence of low congruence between the players who need to agree); 
(c) when the collective players are internally cohesive to be able to use their veto point to 
block a change in the status quo (Tsebelis 1995, 305-313). The theory then becomes 
particularly relevant upon the existence of minorities – with veto power and strongly opposed 
to the change of status quo – that need to be overcome.  Following the framework of the veto 
players theory this hypothesis states that the U-turn was able to defeat the veto power of the 
opposition facilitated by a low level of policy stability in Argentina’s policy making process 
in 2008. To what extent is this statement correct? 
 
Weak De Facto Veto Points – Hypothesis 5 
In addition to the formal veto players, it is also relevant to this analysis to look at the 
influence that other groups – informal players – have over the outcomes of the decision 
making process. Adding to the perspective presented in the previous hypothesis, Bonoli 
(2000) highlights the importance of understanding the politics of pension reform as the 
                                                 
9
 I will use here both concepts as synonyms. 
10
 Policy stability refers to “the impossibility for significant departures from the status quo” (Tsebelis 2001, 13) 
or the absence of the potential for policy change (Tsebelis 1995, 292-293). Thus the level of policy stability 
refers to the likelihood that a piece of legislation that changes the status quo is approved  
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aggregated instance of different interests in society. Attached to this idea, he identifies that 
the “permission” given to nongovernmental actors to influence policy making is a central 
variable in the analysis (29), suggesting that informal veto points could be as crucial as the 
formal ones in determining the success or failure of a project of law. Considering the 
aforementioned, this hypothesis questions whether there were informal veto players in place 
at the time of the 2008 reform that were not interested in or not strong enough to block it. In 
this regard it is of importance to follow the actions of the employees of the AFJPs – as well 
as the national labour unions – who can be expected to be interested in the preservation of 
their sources of labour. The project presented by the Executive already addressed the future 
situation of these actors, yet this would not necessarily mean they would agree with the 
measures decided upon them. In this sense, considering that labour insecurity – or trying to 
avoid it – is a recognizable source for activism that has proven to stop projects in the past, 
this possibility should be addressed.     
 
Declining Influence from External Stakeholders – Hypothesis 6 
Although the general understanding of the influential power that the World Bank (WB) and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have over the local political decisions might not be 
supported by quantitative research, qualitative studies do agree with the fact that these 
institutions have been significant in the diffusion of certain ideas like the case of the World 
Bank regarding pension privatization. This “dramatic shift in the paradigm of social 
protection” (Brooks 2005, 277) was actively promoted by the institution through an 
aggressive campaign that combined both financial resources destined to both lending and 
coaching. “(...) following the publication of its 1994 report, the World Bank's social 
protection team launched a multi-year dissemination project, sponsoring conferences and 
training workshops on structural pension reform around the world” (Brooks 2005, 278-279). 
Ultimately, the goal of the World Bank during the 1980-1990 decade, together with the 
International Monetary Fund, was to “induce developing country governments to swallow the 
"bitter pill" of macroeconomic stabilization” (Brooks 2005, 279), and for that to happen 
extreme measures had to be introduced. Therefore, from an ideological perspective these 
actors should have had some level of interest in a successful and sustainable implementation 
of the private pillar in Argentina.   
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Still, particularly in the Argentine experience, the 1994 reform was early influenced by the 
IMF when the country committed
11
 to it as part of the three-year USD 40 billion Extended 
Fund Facility agreement, signed by both parties in 1992. The World Bank’s participation 
began in 1997 and was accomplished through financial and technical support regarding the 
administrative reform of the public pillar that was managed by the National Social Security 
Administration (ANSeS) and the merging of all provincial funds into the national system 
(Brooks 2004, 85-86). In this way, both the World Bank and IMF could be considered to 
have done some “investing” in the new scheme and thus the question to pose is to what extent 
has the relationship with these two affected the 2008 reform?  
 
3.3.2 Factors strengthening those advocating for the U-turn 
Crisis: a Window of Opportunity – Hypothesis 7 
On September 2008 the subprime mortgage crisis reached a critical stage with the sale of 
Merrill Lynch, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and AIG’s unstable situation, and with its 
international spread into the well known Global Financial Crisis (Sorkin 2008). Locally 
speaking, if we translated these occurrences into the perceptions regarding the private 
pension system’s performance, we could expect an increase in scepticism, uproar and lack of 
support. The crisis then had the potential to leverage the project. Timing is important in 
politics, and during economic crisis voters may prefer politicians who show initiative and 
ability to do dramatic reforms. This would be more likely if the international crisis could be 
presented as a potential threat to the pension system, making it too risky to continue having it 
attached to market fluctuations. The hypothesis here therefore questions the extent to which 
the crisis may be considered thus as a situational factor behind the U-turn.  
 
Financial Struggles – Hypothesis 8 
In the beginning of 2008, after losing the battle to turn into law a new frame for mobile 
export tariffs, the government decided to revoke the tax increases on grain exports and gave 
up “the USD 3 billion to USD 4 billion in additional revenues a year that the higher taxes 
[had been] (...) reaping for the treasury” (Barrionuevo 2008; Sreeharsha and Barrionuevo 
2008)
12
. Later that year, as The Economist (2008) explained the “government [was] (is) 
                                                 
11
 This agreement helped in the negotiations to gain support in the Congress  
12
 During several months, the country was immersed in a battle between the farmers and the government. The 
Reason: the government wanted to convert the soybeans fixed export tariffs (35%) into a floated rate tied to 
global prices that could rise above 44%. In addition to this, the sector was already struggling with increasing 
costs of materials. The land workers’ reaction resulted in a four-month period of strikes and rallies which ended 
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strapped for cash”. With the soybeans price depression of over 44% in three months, tax 
revenues fell by USD 2.7 billion; amid a USD 23 billion of public debt falling due during the 
following two years. So in September, when the government’s move to “charm” foreign 
investors by promising a payoff of USD 7 billion using the Central Bank’s reserves “failed to 
reduce interest rates on Argentine debt” (The Economist 2008) the situation appeared to have 
been reaching its limits. In this regard and considering that critical stances make people 
become creative and look for solutions in the most unexpected places the question to ask is 
how much of the reform can be therefore explained as a solution to the money shortage the 
country was going through?  
 
Financial Temptations – Hypothesis 9 
By the end of September 2008, the total number of affiliates (beneficiaries and contributors) 
of the fully funded pillar was 9.5 million people, the accumulated funds ARS 94.5 billion
13
 
and the contributions collected were of ARS 1 billion monthly and ARS 15 billion annually 
(Bermudez 2008; Arza 2009, 18). The reform implied a transfer to the State of the 
accumulated privately managed funds together with all workers – and derived cash flows – 
being relocated under the umbrella of the pay-as-you-go, defined-benefit, public scheme 
(Kay 2009, 8). Furthermore, 10% of the accumulated amount had been invested in private 
company shares, which consequently, with the transfer, would give the State some influence 
over those private companies AFJPs had invested on. All these implications lead to the 
question about how much of the return to the pay-as-you-go DB scheme could also be related 
to the issue of who should have the control over the allocation of national capital in Argentine 
society. 
 
Cultural Specificities in the Political Decision-Making Process - Hypothesis 10 
Complementing the veto player theory that aims to explain policy change by analysing the 
political system in place (Tsebelis 1995, 289), in order to understand a specific policy 
outcome, it is necessary to extend that analysis to the political culture that characterizes the 
system, that is, “the matrix of meanings embodied in expressive symbols, practices, and 
beliefs that constitute ordinary politics in a bounded collectivity” (Berezin 1997, 364). In 
relation to this case study, Kay (2009) claims that the pension system reform carried out in 
                                                                                                                                                        
in July 2008 when the bill was finally vetoed in the Senate 37-36 votes, being the vice President who broke the 
tie in favour the agriculture producers (Barrionuevo 2008).  
13
 This represented USD 30.2 billion (Arza 2009, 18). According to ANSeS director, this amount reduced to 
ARS 78.7 billion by 23 October (Boudou 2008). See appendix 3 figure 6 for further documentation. 
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Argentina in 2008 presented “[...] no public debate or any hint that a core social programme 
would be reformed before the legislation was introduced and quickly approved” (10). The 
author’s statement suggests that there were some particular conditions in the Argentine 
political culture that made this last reform possible. Likely, these conditions could also 
explain how the same party
14
 was able to present and pass two opposite projects of law in a 
short period time. The argument suggested in this hypothesis is that there might be a cultural 
acceptance for interference – surrendering to temptations – in the Argentine political culture 
and/or a pre-existing culture of fast legislative action that would enable the U-turn. 
 
A Viable Alternative – Hypothesis 11 
In order for a policy change to take place, it is not sufficient if there is lack of satisfaction 
with the existing order of things. Someone must also be able to put forward a convincing 
(superior) alternative, preferably in a way that does not provoke those who have some stake 
in the existing system. In this context it is important to notice that the Constitution at the top 
of the legal pyramid delegates to the State the obligation of granting old age care in Argentine 
society (Constitution of the Argentine Nation, section 14 bis) while at the same time it 
demands that “Property may not be violated, […]. Expropriation for reasons of public interest 
must be authorized by law and previously compensated. […] The confiscation of property is 
hereby abolished forever from the Argentine Criminal Code […].” (Constitution of the 
Argentine Nation, section 17). Therefore, if a return to PAYG-DB could be presented in a 
way that would not deprive people of their rights gained in the funded system, or even better 
as an alternative where existing pension rights would be supported by credible non-market 
based mechanisms and therefore presented as even more secure than funded benefits, then 
opposition to the U-turn might be minimized. How was then the government able to present 
the U-turn as a viable alternative considering the aforementioned? 
 
Having in mind the premises and arguments presented, what follows is a map of the policy 
making process in Argentina and an in-depth analysis of the events that took place and 
facilitated the approval of the new reform in 2008. The final objective of the following 
sections will be to grasp into the deeds and search for evidence that could support any, if not 
                                                 
14
 The first project presented in 27 August, 1992 was signed by former President Carlos S. Menem who 
belonged to Justicialist Party (PJ), Domingo F. Cavallo (former Minister of Economy from 1991 until 1996) and 
Rodolfo A. Díaz (former Minister of Labour and Social Security from 1991 until 1992) (Ministry of Economy 
and Public Finances offial website; Ministry of Labour and Social Security official website; Law 24.241 - 
Transcriptions of the Legislative Process)  
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all, hypotheses presented in order to dig into the reasons why in 2008 the Argentine 
Government undid the 14 years of path of the funded system 
 
4 A Closer Look into Argentina’s Policy Making Process 
The U-turn in Argentina’s pension policy implied a decision made at the national level. 
Therefore, in order to fully understand why that particular decision was made, it is necessary 
to get into the details concerning how political decisions are generally made in Argentina and 
what were the conditions – resulting from the political culture and the electoral results – that 
also shaped that process at the time of the reform. In addition to presenting the particular 
characteristics of Argentina’s policy making process, the following sections will help 
illustrate the level of policy stability – in terms of the veto player theory which is further 
analyzed under section 6.1 – and the outline of the sequence of decisions that resulted in the 
U-turn already introduced in section 3.2 and further analysed in chapter 5.   
 
4.1 The Argentine Legislative Process 
The Argentine legislative process is the legal framework for making and enacting national 
law. Its ground rules are covered by sections 77 to 84 of the Argentine Constitution, while the 
more specific elements of the process are framed by further procedural rules
15
.  
 
The Argentine Congress has a bicameral composition and the Constitution allows projects to 
be presented by the legislators or the Executive in either of the houses
16
 – the House of 
Representatives or the Senate – determining for each process a chamber of origin and a 
revising chamber. During the legislative process, both chambers have one possibility to veto 
the project or to modify it, which can lead to multiple approval (or veto) scenarios
17
. If it is 
                                                 
15
 I will not cover here those other documents given that the Constitutional framework provides enough 
information to the objective of this section.   
16
 However, there are certain matters that commonly require being treated first in one of the chambers 
(Constitution of the Argentine Nation, Section 77, 13) 
17
 (1) The simplest scenario tells us that once approved by the chamber in which it was originated, the bill shall 
be debated in the second. Once approved by both houses, it should be sent to the Executive for its assessment 
and approval, becoming law. (2) The second possibility is that the bill gets totally vetoed by either of the houses. 
In this case the project cannot be reintroduced in the same year´s sessions. (3) The third option refers to the 
project being approved by absolute majority in the originating chamber and subjected to additions and 
amendments by the revising one, with absolute majority (or two thirds of its members). Consequently, the 
project shall be treated again in the originating house with three possible results: (a) acceptance of the 
modification in the originating house, approval of the bill in the revising chamber and subsequent presentation 
to the Executive for its assessment; (b) Insistence on the original text by the same amount or more votes than 
those the revising house had for the modifications and amendments (at least absolute majority or two thirds of 
its members), approval in the originating House and presentation to the Executive; or (c) Impossibility of the 
originating House to impose the original text by absolute majority (or two thirds of its members), approval in the 
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not vetoed by either of the houses, the resultant approved bill is to be presented to the 
Executive, who owns the third veto point. The Executive receives the (modified) project once 
approved by the Congress to be examined with the options of promulgating and publicizing it 
or rejecting (vetoing) it, partially or totally. A vetoed bill by the Executive then returns to the 
Congress where it has to be retreated with the observations performed. Two thirds of the 
votes are required in each chamber for the project to become approved and enforced to the 
Executive as it was passed by the Congress; otherwise the project cannot be retreated during 
the same year’s sessions (Constitution of the Argentine Nation; House of Representatives 
official website - Argentina's Policy Making Process).  
 
4.2 Political Institutions and Parties 
To complete the picture, it is necessary to portray the actors who were involved in the 
decision making process that resulted in the shift back to the pay-as-you-go DB public 
pension system in Argentina in 2008.  
 
Argentina’s political regime is organized on the basis of separation of powers into an 
executive (President), a legislature (Congress) and a judiciary (Supreme Court). It has a 
federal structure which separates the National Government from the 23 autonomous 
Provinces and the federal capital
18
, and has a bicameral Congress consisting of a House of 
Representatives and a Senate.  
 
The House of Representatives consists of 257 seats, half of which is renewed every two 
years, thus corresponding with a renewal of one-half (or its closest equivalent) of each 
electoral district delegation. Seats are allocated to each multi-member district on the basis of 
its population
19
, while representatives compete in the elections in close party lists and are 
assigned a bench following a proportional representation system
 20
. The Senate consists of 72 
seats. Each province has three seats, corresponding two of them to the plurality party and one 
to the first runner-up. Senators are directly elected by the voters from closed party lists and 
                                                                                                                                                        
revising chamber and presentation to the Executive (Constitution of the Argentine Nation; House of 
Representatives official website - Argentina's Policy Making Process). 
18
 For the purpose of this paper the federal capital will be considered as one more “Province”, thus referring to 
all as the 24 electoral districts. 
19
 Following 1980 census (Jones 2004, 1) and with the additional rules that establish that no Province can 
receive less than 5 seats or less than those it had in 1973-76 democratic period (Jones 2002, 148). 
20
 Voters cannot influence those lists, instead they vote for a party as a whole. Each party will get in number of 
seats, the proportional to the votes obtained (Jones 2004, 1).  
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elections are carried out every two years when one-third of the Senate is renewed
21
. Finally, 
in order to run for elections, both chambers members need to fulfil resident criteria at the 
district they represent and be part of a registered political party, for which the law establishes 
relatively “flexible” rules admitting the existence of many small independent parties (Jones 
2008, 1-2).  
 
Once elected, legislators – coming from different districts – can organize themselves in 
parliamentary groups
22
 representing the party their members belong to
23
. They act as internal 
political groups with an agreed position as regards particular matters. The objective of this 
arrangement is to simplify legislative work provided that the blocs will keep coherent criteria 
and strategy upon certain matters. These parliamentary groups have administrative 
recognition and organization
24
 when their number of members is higher than 3, which entitle 
them to its own budget and assigned resources
2526
. Their authorities represent the entire group 
in front of the chambers’ authorities and the parties’ national authorities. It is also in terms of 
the parliamentary groups that party discipline is determined in the chambers. Each group 
meets before each session to discuss and agree on the standpoint their members will all work 
upon and which will be reflected in their votes. If a legislator expresses a contrary position 
than that agreed on, it is said there is lack of party discipline, leading to a possible fracture of 
the group. Historically, these fractures have resulted in the creation of new political parties 
(Wernicke 2007, 69-71; Argentine Senate official website).        
 
                                                 
21
 Districts are divided into three groups for the renewal of their seats, therefore each Senator lasts six years in 
his/her position (Jones 2004, 1-2) 
22
 A parliamentary group is here defined as a group of elected legislators (belonging to the same party) that are 
formally and organically organized (Polylingual Parliamentary Glossary 2005, 5). In a direct translation from 
argentine political linguistics the term used is “blocs”. In some other literature – especially European – these 
maybe called party factions or even party fractions (Brady and Bullock 1983, 600-601). The concepts found in 
the literature are pretty much blurry. Thus, for purpose of simplification, I will just refer to them as bare 
parliamentary groups or blocs as an alternative synonym.   
23
 These groups not necessarily need to consist of all the elected members of a party. In this way the same party 
may have several parliamentary groups. 
24
 There is a president in all cases and vice-president and secretary in the majoritarian ones (Wernicke 2007, 70) 
25
 Politically, unipersonal blocs are also recognized (Wernicke 2007, 69) 
26
 Majoritarian groups tend to be more independent from the parties they are representing than the minortarians 
and unipersonal ones. However these can also ally with other parliamentary groups – belonging to the same or 
another party – in order to increase the number of members and therefore increase their assigned budget and 
resources. These are called inter-blocs which – when belonging to different parties – might resemble what Brady 
and Bullock (1983600-601) and Sartori (2005) call cross-party groups and other authors define as party 
coalitions. Again the literature does not agree in one way of defining these concepts. Here I define them simply 
as alliances between two or more parliamentary groups (from the same or different party) as mentioned earlier. 
To be accepted as such, they should have the same political affinity and interests but they are not mandated to 
have the same position or vote in the same direction as regards the issues debated, thus not creating a potential 
conflict with the concept of party discipline as explained in the running text (Wernicke 2007, 69).  
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Since its return to democracy in 1983 Argentina’s political arena has been mostly steered by 
two parties: Justicialist Party (PJ) – a.k.a. “peronists” – and Radical Civic Union (UCR) – 
a.k.a. “radicals”.  Both parties have national presence and are organized as a replicate of the 
federal political division, where each provincial unit holds considerable autonomy from their 
national organization level. As regards representation, given their heterogeneity they could be 
considered as catch-all parties
27
, however their targeting strategies differ along several 
aspects. UCR has shown a rather higher level of institutionalization, support for liberal 
democracy, and a more formalized selection and recruitment procedures that has given the 
party a contrasting profile from its competitor (De Luca 2008, 4).  
 
The Justicialist Party, founded in 1947, had been historically known for its link with the 
labour movement with a strong collective identity, and a more informal organization and 
leader and candidate’s selection and recruitment. The union dominance within the party 
comprised three areas: financing, mobilization and representation within different party 
leadership levels. However, by the end of the 1980s, this party-union linkage was said to have 
been rapidly destroyed when PJ went through a deep change in its internal distribution of 
power and preferences, leading to the establishment of a machine party
28
 (Levitsky 2003, 4-
5). Likewise, many scholars agree upon the emergence of new intra-party dynamics present 
in the Argentine party system since the return to democracy: machine politics, characterized 
by patron-client relationships where particularistic exchanges
29
 began to co-exist with – and 
sometimes displace – former intra-party mechanisms of power and discipline, such as rank 
and file commitment to principles and values (Scherlis 2008, 579-590; Levitsky 2003, 25-
30). Considering these new practices within the Argentine political culture one can appreciate 
that there has been a change in the party identity of PJ – from labour-based to a more client-
                                                 
27
 As defined by Richard Gunther (2005) – revisiting Otto Kirchheimer's model – the main characteristics of 
catch-all parties are their superficial organization and ideology, a strong electoral orientation, and the presence 
of powerful national candidates both in terms of their party leadership and electoral roles. They are mainly 
focused on electoral vote-maximization in order to win elections by catching diverse social interests under their 
umbrella (259). 
28
 Machine parties use their resources to create clientelist linkages. They mobilize individuals and groups by 
distributing selective incentives in exchange for votes, loyalty and political support. The objective is to 
strengthen the patron-client relationship: intra-party and between the party and the electorate. One important 
manifestation of this relationship is thus the level of electoral support (Jones 2004, 7; Scherlis 2008, 582). In this 
way, the concepts of machine parties and catch-all parties share that focus on gaining electoral support and their 
ideological ambiguity. Thus not being exclusive concepts. The former, however, specifically refers to the 
strategies used to achieve that support (See over comment on catch-all party definition). Consequently a party 
can be both at the same time.   
29
 These include “patronage” or “clientelism” (generally used as synonyms) regarding the distribution of 
material help or services to gain political support. And “pork barrel” mechanisms, used when the government 
assigns public fund to specific projects that benefit a determined group (Scherlis 2008, 583-584).  
29 
 
based – that allowed party ideology to operate within more flexible platforms and 
organizations, providing more pragmatic and effective instruments for policy change without 
jeopardizing the internal party stability.  
 
The role of national minorities and provincial parties has been, since 1983, very marginal in 
comparison with the former two. The latter refers to those parties that could only successfully 
compete in one province
30
 as either the dominant party or its main opposition, for example 
Neuquén People's Movement (MPN – Movimiento Popular Neuquino) and Salta Renewal 
Party (PRS – Partido Renovador de Salta). The former had since 1983 until 2008 several 
exemplars that arrived to the national scene, yet very few were able to consolidate outside 
their original scope: Greater Buenos Aires
31
 and the federal capital (De Luca 2008, 5; Jones 
2008, 2). However, for some of them the situation changed given the impact of the 2001 
political-economical crisis over UCR’s image32. 
 
The 2007 elections were a reflection of this situation as it showed a still very weak and 
divided “radical” party and a divided opposition among UCR, other minority parties and 
dissident peronists
33
. The electoral alliance Front for Victory (FPV)
34
 made a successful 
election and with 45 percent of the votes, Cristina Kirchner (FPV-PJ) was elected president, 
supported by three-quarters of the country’s 23 governors, 160 of 257 seats in the House of 
Representatives, and 47 of 74 Senate seats
35
. The dissident peronists were able to send 10 
representatives and 5 senators to the Congress, and the non-peronist opposition had the rest of 
the seats, among these UCR, Civic Coalition-Support for an Egalitarian Republic
36
 (CC-ARI 
– Coalición Cívica-Afirmación para una República Igualitaria), and Republican Proposal37 
(PRO – Propuesta Republicana) were the most salient (Levitsky and Murillo 2008, 16-17). 
                                                 
30
 It refers here to those Provinces belonging to what is commonly known as the “Interior region”. The concept 
encompasses those districts other than Buenos Aires and the federal capital (De Luca 2004, 5). 
31
 Greater Buenos Aires is the name given to the municipalities (part of the Province of Buenos Aires) adjacent 
to the federal capital that emerged as the conurbation of the city.  
32
 Argentina was going through a very deep economic turndown and the radical President Fernando de la Rúa, 
who was ruling at that time, was not able to finish his mandate, resigning and leaving the steering of the country 
in the hands of the Congress since his Vice-President had resigned some time before him. 
33
 Those who were not aligned with Front for Victory and who kept themselves independent from the incumbent 
President. 
34
 A coalition among pro-Kirchner (the incumbent President in 2007) candidates from the Justicialist Party and 
other parties – including UCR – that targeted the hard core of the peronist votes (low income families) and the 
most progressive oriented members of the urban middle classes. This alliance later translated into a 
parliamentary group and an inter-bloc in the chambers (Bonvecchi and Giraudy 2008, 38). 
35
 The numbers include the pro-Kirchner politicians belonging to non-PJ parties.  
36
 Social liberal political party. 
37
 Right-wing political party. 
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As I will refer to in section 6.1, this lack of cohesion in the opposition side will imply – in 
terms of the veto players theory – an advantage for the government to change policy status 
quo. 
 
Moving along in the analysis, I go over now the composition of the chambers in order to 
address the level of congruence (relevant to the veto player theory) between them, that is, 
how similar/dissimilar they are. In general terms, one could say that party affiliation is more 
stable than bloc participation. However, given the dynamics of the Argentine party system as 
I have already presented it, bloc structure would provide a better overview of the real political 
positions in the chambers at the time of the pension system reform in 2008. The review of the 
parliamentary groups here presented was elaborated upon information collected from the 
transcripts of the debate in 2008 (House Session 06/11/2008 Voting; Senate Session 
20/11/2008 Transcript), information on the Senate blocs in place previous that year which 
was developed by TELAM
38
 and published by a local newspaper (Télam 2008), information 
from the online Senate archive (Senators History), and the list of recognized political parties 
(Argentine Judiciary official website). The snapshot showed that in both chambers the 
majoritarian bloc was that of Front for Victory (FPV-PJ)
39
 with 127 (49,61%) representatives 
and 32 senators (44,44%). The first House minority was UCR with 24 deputies (9,38%), 
followed by Civic Coalition-ARI-GEN-UPT with 18 (7,03%), the Socialist Party with 10 
(3,91%), and Republican Proposal and Solidarity and Equality-ARI (T.D.F) with 9 deputies 
each (3,52%). The next 7 blocs had 32 representatives (12,50%) and the last 27 seats 
(10,55%) were divided among 23 parliamentary groups. The Senate presented a slightly 
different structure. The first minority was formed by the so called dissident peronists bloc 
with 12 senators (16,67%), followed by UCR who had 10 senators (13,89%), Civic and 
Social Front with 4 seats (5,56%) and Support for an Egalitarian Republic (ARI – Afirmación 
por una República de Iguales) and Civic Coalition with 2 seats each (2,78%). The remaining 
10 seats (13,89%) were divided among the rest of parliamentary groups
40
.  
 
In this way, both chambers show highly analogous compositions. Front for Victory had the 
plurality in both chambers, but it still needed allies from other groups to get legislation 
approved. This extra support was presumably expected to come from the many legislators 
                                                 
38
 Télam is the Argentine national news agency (Télam official website) 
39
 This refers only to the pro-administration PJ legislators 
40
 For further detail on the composition of the parliamentary groups during the 2008 refer to tables 2 and 3 in 
Chapter 5 (sections 5.1 and 5.2 – voting results of the 2008 pension system reform) 
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from other political parties who, during the 2007 elections, had joined the FPV electoral 
alliance. Still this did not necessarily mean unconditional support.  
 
The findings presented in these last two sections (4.1 and 4.2) are particularly relevant in 
order to analyse how the Constitutional framework and the electoral results influenced the 
level of policy stability in terms of the veto player theory, particularly for determining the 
number of veto players and evaluating the level of congruence and cohesion of the veto 
player(s) as we shall see in section 6.1 when all hypotheses are discussed.     
 
5 The Sequence of Decisions that Resulted in the U-Turn 
5.1 The Proposal and the Constitutional Arguments  
The formal legislative process started on 21
 
October 2008, when the Executive presented to 
the House of Representatives the project of law to eliminate the fully funded-DC private 
scheme and replace it with a PAYG-DB public one. The argument supporting the proposal 
was based in section 14bis of the Constitution of the Argentine Nation, which states that “The 
State shall grant the benefits of social security, which shall be of an integral nature and may 
not be waived” (Constitution of the Argentine Nation, 2), and concepts of solidarity, 
inclusiveness and redistribution “following the policies developed by the Executive since 
2003” (Bill 26425 (proposed law)). 
 
The document expressed the Executive’s understanding of pensions as the instrument aimed 
to provide certainty to citizens once they are no longer active, subscribing – in consequence – 
to the criticism of the introduction of 1994’s fully funded, defined-contribution, private 
scheme which had tied contributions to market risks and which – by 2008 – had low and 
declining coverage, high associated litigation levels, “frozen” benefits, inequality between 
public and private coexisting provisions and deficient management. For these reasons the 
Executive explained this reform was put forward as the way to take a more active role in the 
reconstruction of the pay-as-you-go system and to acknowledge its Constitutional duty in the 
protection of individuals, families and society regarding the quality of the Institutions needed 
to achieve Social Justice within the economic growth model (Ibid; Mesa-Lago 2009, 18). 
 
Simultaneously, on the other side, the Constitution was the argument used by those opposing 
the reform project as it was presented by the Executive. They considered that the 
accumulated funds were private property and, in that regard, the Constitution of the 
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Argentine Nation states in its section 17 that “Property may not be violated, […]. 
Expropriation for reasons of public interest must be authorized by law and previously 
compensated. […] The confiscation of property is hereby abolished forever from the 
Argentine Criminal Code […].” (Constitution of the Argentine Nation, section 17). Thus, the 
Constitution worked both ways in the discussion: as a factor that would strengthen those 
defending the reform and as one strengthening the opposition.  
 
Still, for both arguments the Constitution left room for interpretation and counterarguments. 
In the first case, it let the debate go around the positions of the different actors involved in 
terms of how they operationalized that goal of granting pension benefits. In the second case, 
the Constitution mandated that if expropriation for reason of public interest – which 
consequently would have had to be proven – should be carried out, it should be authorized by 
law and compensated. And this last was what the Executive was trying to accomplish with 
the presentation of the project of reform. Thus, that argument of unconstitutionality of the 
reform was weaker and able to be easily jumped over given the support gained by the 
Executive, as it will be presented in the following sections. This matter is particularly 
relevant in relation with determining the veto power of the opposition. If the reform had 
implied a real change in the Constitutional rules or a real unconstitutional law, the role of the 
opposition could have been much stronger.     
 
In the following titles I present the sequence of events that are summarized in table 1 below.   
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Summary of the Legislative process 
Table 1  
Chamber of Origin Revising Chamber Promulgation and Publication 
HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 
SENATE  
Original Project 
Date of entry: 21/10/2008 
File: 27-PE-08 
Authors: the Executive Power 
(Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner, Sergio Massa and 
Carlos Tomada) 
Committees 
Committee on Social Provision 
and Social Security   
Committee on Budget and 
Finance  
Date of the report: 04/11/2008 
Committee report no 1167/2008 
Session 
Debate date: 06/11/2008 
Approval 
Date: 06/11/2008 
Approved text by the House 
Date of entry: 07/11/2008 
File: 70-CD-08 
Committees 
Committee on Labour and 
Social Provision  
Committee on Budget and 
Finance  
Date of the report: 12/11/2008 
Committee report no 1168/2008 
Session 
Debate date: 20/11/2008 
Final approval 
Date: 20/11/2008 
Promulgation 
Decree: 2099/08 
Date: 04/12/2008 
Official Gazette publication 
date: 09/12/2008 
 
Publication of Law 26.425 
Official Gazette publication 
date: 09/12/2008 
 
Source: (Bill 26425 (proposed law); Decree 2099/08; House Committees Report No 1167 
2008; House Session 06/11/2008 Transcript; House Session 06/11/2008 Voting; Legislative 
Process - Bill 26.425; Official Publication of the ratified Law 24.425 2008; Polylingual 
Parliamentary Glossary 2005; Senate Committees Report No1168 2008; Senate Session 
20/11/2008 Transcript; Wernicke 2009, 2) 
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5.2 House of Representatives 
Committees
41
 
Following the Congress’s procedures, the proposed bill was first debated in the House of 
Representatives. The House Committees on Budget and Finance
42
 and on Social Provision 
and Social Security
43
 were in charge of reporting on the project presented by the government 
(House of Representatives Rules and Regulations 2010 Sections 65 and 70, 11-12). After five 
days of deliberations, on 5 November, their members voted on what would be passed to and 
debated on the House floor.   
 
The majority (36 out of 57)
44
  advised the proposal should be approved with a series of 
adjustments, the most significant being: (1) the addition of a section to regulate the system’s 
resource management (Section 8 of the final law), (2) the creation of the System’s 
Sustainability Guarantee Fund Council that would overview the system’s resources 45  – 
section 12 of the final law –, (3) the removal of the Executive’s task to elaborate an amended 
text of the Law 24.241 (1994 Reform), which would have also given the Executive 
discretionary power to eliminate content that was considered conflicting with or out-of date 
regarding the new legislation (House Committees Report No 1167/2008, 1-4.) 
 
The first minority
46
 consisted of 8 UCR Representatives who expressed their disagreement to 
the bill suggesting rejecting the form but not the substance. They proposed to replace the 
fully funded, defined-contribution, private system in a more systematic and comprehensive 
fashion, reaching for exhaustive legislative debate, criteria and consensus. Therefore, they 
intended to declare a 180-day transitional period for the National Congress – the competent 
                                                 
41
 The Committees are specialized groups constituted by legislators whose main task is to study a particular 
subject intensely – analyzing, filtering and adding value to it – and to advise the chambers in order to reach a 
more sensible and efficient decision (House of Representatives Rules and Regulations. Commented version 
1996, 212) 
42
 Competent on issues of national budget, tax law or any public income related policies (House of 
Representatives Rules and Regulations 2010 Sections 65, 11). 
43
 Committee qualified to report on projects regarding social security, retirement benefits and pensions (House 
of Representatives Rules and Regulations 2010 Sections 70, 12). 
44
 30 (52% ) of the total members of the committee belonged to the ruling party and 28 of them subscribed the 
reform  (House Committees Report No 1167 2008; House Session 06/11/2008 Voting) 
45
 The Sustainability Guaranty Fund was a reserve fund created in 2007 to manage the surpluses of the pension 
system. The aims of the fund were (1) smoothing the negative financial impact of economic and social variables 
on public retirement provision, (2) act as a reserve fund to be invested accordingly to its nature, (3) contribute to 
maintain the system resources’ value and profitability, and (4) compensate for financial shortages to guarantee 
pension provision (Decree 897/07 Section 1, 2-3)    
46
 The minority reports and the partial dissidences with the majority report are to be treated during the debate in 
particular (House of Representatives Rules and Regulations 2010 Section 113, 19). In the case the majority 
report is vetoed, the minority reports are to be voted upon regarding their order (Alemán 2003, 11) 
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milieu and actor – to develop the applicable legislation. The four other minority reports stated 
their opposition to the majority presenting different arguments, yet converging upon the idea 
that the system needed a more thorough reform. Still, out of the five reports, the second 
(coalition of right winged parties) and fifth minority (FPV-PJ) were the only advocating for 
the affiliates of the private scheme. This illustrates the relevance of hypothesis 2 in 
explaining the U-turn due to the presence of weak material interested groups. They claimed 
the new bill would damage the property rights gained by those who had chosen the private 
over the public system
47
. And, as an alternative, the latter proposed the introduction of a 
publicly managed, notional defined contribution scheme for these affiliates (Ibid, 4-19) .  
 
However, all reports considered, none advocated for a continuance of the fully funded system 
as it was in place as of 2008. Their propositions, to different extents, claimed the entire 
pension system needed a review for improvement, illustrating how – as presumed in 
hypotheses 1 and 11 – the funded, defined-contribution, private scheme was neither 
positively perceived in terms of its accomplishments nor as a better alternative to the public 
scheme as it was expected to be when it was introduced in 1994. The arguments were more 
oriented toward avoiding the destruction of rights created instead of actively defending the 
benefits of such a structure.      
 
Debate 
On 29 October, the necessary minimum number of representatives
48
 requested the bill were 
debated in a special session of the House of Representatives on 6 November 2008. The 
debate lasted 14 hours. The opening statement on the floor was made by Juan Carlos Díaz 
Roig (FPV-PJ) who presented the majority report that defended the project and counter 
argued the one and strongest argument the opposition had in order to be able to veto the 
project: the property rights the affiliates had over the funds accumulated by the private tier. 
To this pro-administration deputy the argument about property rights being jeopardized was 
mistaken in that the concept of private property – within pension systems and pension rights 
– is not that of “real property”, i.e. which could be disposed or trade. On the contrary, he 
argued, property rights with regards to pension funds have a much more ample meaning. A 
                                                 
47
 Law 26.222 granted the capability to transfer one’s funds from one scheme to another once every five years 
(Law 26.222 Section 30, 13) 
48
 Section 35 of the House rules and regulations establishes that when requested by the Executive or ten or more 
members of the chamber a special session may be called which need not to comply with the seven-business-day 
requirement (counted from the committees reports) stated in section 113 of the same document (House of 
Representatives Rules and Regulations 2010, Section 35, 5).  
36 
 
person would not be entitled to a benefit, but until he/she had fulfilled the required years 
contributing to the system and had turned the determined age for a person to retire. This 
would mean that the right to a pension benefit would not be deprived by a change in the 
design. And it gave support to the reform as a viable alternative as stated in hypothesis 11 
when claiming that the question of whether the system should be privately or publicly 
managed was at a different argument level than whether the reform would implicate a 
violation of the affiliates’ property rights (House Session 06/11/2008 Transcript, 6-24) 
 
Likewise, the different minorities had their opportunity to present their reports as well as the 
– shared by almost all – interpretation of this bill being only an instrument for the Executive 
to get control over the funds (Ibid). At this point in the process the government was not 
explicitly recognizing any financial interest in transferring the funds, though this was still 
alleged by those against the reform. They believed the reform was underpinned by the 
objective of getting control over national capital in order to allow the government counteract 
the economic slowdown – stressed by the international crisis – Argentina was going through 
and the unsuccessful governmental measures to solve the financial shortages (House Session 
06/11/2008 Transcript, 127-129). And so, the chamber’s open floor debate that followed was 
dominated by supporters and detractors of the project in terms of whether this control should 
have been in the hands of the State or the market and why;  exposing hypotheses 7 (crisis), 8 
(financial struggles) and 9 (financial temptations) as arguments in the discussion. Some were 
for and some were against the State regaining the control over that part of the National 
Capital.  
 
For those in favour of reforming the pension system, two rationales were prevalent: (1) one of 
full agreement and belief in the active role of the State regarding social protection, 
considering this bill was both the only way to guarantee a quality old age provision and, 
concurring with the Executive’s arguments, one more of the measures directed to dismantle 
the model established during the 1990s; (2) a more pragmatic line of reasoning that 
acknowledged the intrinsic flaws of this piece of legislation but considered it a “window of 
opportunity”, a starting point for the reconstruction of the public system. As the State would 
regain full control over the administration of the funds it would become enabled to start 
working on a more comprehensive system, while avoiding the uncertainty and increased legal 
insecurity that would arise due to a delayed decision.  
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Among other similar statements during the debate, this was one example of how market 
fluctuations can be conceptualized as very volatile with regard to political decisions – 
especially during the decision making process – and of how having a pension system that 
relies on them can be considered an unbearable risk for society in terms of social security. 
Thus, as previously mentioned, in the naissance of an international crisis, scepticism, uproar 
and lack of support became the drivers that led to fast manoeuvring, illustrating how the crisis 
was conceptualized as a window of opportunity as stated in hypothesis 7. It therefore seems 
that it was then believed that the longer the system was left “unprotected” from the financial 
events happening worldwide, the deeper the damage that would have to be nonetheless 
repaired.   
 
Opposition groups additionally argued the statement that poses the State is the only one 
responsible for the provision of social security was erred in that, according to jurisprudence, 
the responsibility established by the Constitution refers to the way social security should be 
legislated, and that the State’s scope of action may be reduced to organizer and controller. 
The project was mainly criticized for lacking technique, not solving the accountability 
problems that the private administrators were accused of, not guaranteeing a good transition 
management of the funds, violating property rights, deepening distrust, law insecurity and 
political risk, and not having been discussed by the Constitutional matters committee, among 
others (House Session 06/11/2008 Transcript, 10-11). Grounds were mainly presented around 
the flaws of the proposal without anyone advocating for any goodness of the private scheme 
and therefore displaying the lack of political support towards the 1994 reform and 
exemplifying the assumptions presented in hypotheses 1 (perceived weaknesses of the private 
scheme), 2 (weak material interest groups) and 3 (weak political prestige stakeholders). Their 
discourse seems to unveil the fact that neither parties – as organizations – nor the legislators 
personally had much political prestige invested in the funded system. That they had not real 
ownership over it and that, in consequence their reputation would not be threatened by 
neither the lack of support nor their explicitly expressed perception of a malfunctioning 
private scheme. What adds explanation to this case is the lack of continuance of those 
deputies who voted for the 1994 reform. Only 2 of the deputies seating and voting in 2008 
had been present in the sessions in 1993 when the previous reform was debated and both of 
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them were supporting the shift back to pay-as-you-go
49
 (Law 24.241 - Transcripts of the 
Legislative Process; House Session 06/11/2008 Voting).  
 
Looking at the dynamics that took place on the floor debate we start noticing how, when 
trying to explain the 2008 events, we cannot reduce our understanding to just one static 
variable. Indeed several factors were simultaneously interacting and influencing each other, 
which, at that point, were also enabling the defeat of the first veto point: the approval of the 
bill in the House of Representatives.   
 
Voting  
From the 257 members
50
 of the House, the government needed only more than half the 
presents – absolute majority of the members present – to get the reform approved. This 
represented 120 of the 238 representatives that attended that day sessions (House of 
Representatives official website - Argentina's Policy Making Process). At the end of the 
debate, the House passed the bill with 162 positive against 75 negative votes as FPV-PJ (115 
positive votes) got supported by the Socialist Party (10 positive votes) and Solidarity and 
Equality-ARI (T.D.F.) (7 positive votes). The remaining minorities, UCR (22 negative votes), 
Civic Coalition-ARI-GEN-UPT (17 negative votes) and PRO (9 negative votes) voted 
against. The rest of the representatives
51
 were divided 30 for and 22 against the bill (House 
Session 06/11/2008 Voting). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49
 I did not have access to the detail account of votes in 1993. 
50
This includes the President of the House who only votes in cases of draw, when he/she has asked permission 
to participate on the debate by having someone replace his chair, or in cases of absolute or special majorities 
required by the Constitution (House of Representatives Rules and Regulations 2010 Section 41, 6).   
51
 Most belonging to parties with one seat  
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House voting 
Table 2  
Source: Own elaboration based on data from House Session 06/11/2008 Voting
52
. 
                                                 
52
 See appendix 2 for the names in Spanish 
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5.3 Senate  
According to section 78 of the Argentine Constitution once a bill is approved by the chamber 
in which it was presented, it passes on to the other one for its treatment, in this case the 
Senate (Constitution of the Argentine Nation). This characteristic of bicameral systems 
allows the second chamber to become a potential seat for veto power, making the process 
more difficult to overcome.  
 
Committees
53
 
Day 1:  
During the first committee sessions in the Senate, the Minister of Labour, Employment and 
Social Security, Carlos Tomada, and the Director of ANSeS, Amado Boudou, presented the 
project to the committee on Labour and Social Security and the committee on Budget and 
Finance. The central points of their presentation were related to the poor performance of the 
private scheme, providing to the relevance of hypothesis 1 in explaining the U-turn: (a) the 
high costs derived from the high level of administration fees
54
; (b) the impact of the financial 
crisis over the system’s returns55; (c) the low level of diversity in the investments, mostly 
reduced to public bonds with low level of return
56
; (d) the inability of the private scheme to 
boost the local stock market as it was expected when it was put in place
57
; (e) the increased 
level of public expenditure on pensions to complement the funded benefits
58
; and (f) the 
inability of the private scheme to increase coverage, which was only possible after the State 
increased its participation in pension provision with the reforms of 2006 and 2007, which 
were aimed at promoting inclusion
59
 (Boudou 2008; Senate plenary sessions Day 1).  
  
The senators reviewed some unclear points about the modified project passed by the House of 
Representatives but no changes were requested. The only contestant position was that of the 
President of the Committee on Labour and Social Security. Belonging to UCR, he defended 
their counter project and criticized the discretional power the bill was giving the Government, 
                                                 
53
 In the case of the Senate committees, in addition to the reports, I had also access to the transcripts of the 
sessions and the presentations of the different speakers. According to the newspapers, these same presentations 
were also done in the House committees (Cufré 2008; Jorquera 2008). However, since I did not have access to 
the official transcripts of the session in the House committees these presentations are only analyzed under the 
Senate committees’ section. 
54
 See appendix 3 figure 3 for further documentation. 
55
 See appendix 3 figures 4, 5 and 6 for further documentation. 
56
 See appendix 3 figures 5 and 7 for further documentation. 
57
 See appendix 3 figures 9 for further documentation. 
58
 See appendix 3 figures 10 and 12 for further documentation. 
59
 See appendix 3 figures 11 for further documentation 
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the lack of proper controls over the use of the funds, the need for a proper transitional plan 
and, once again, stated the system required a much more comprehensive reform (Senate 
plenary sessions Day 1) 
 
Day 2:  
The second day was divided between two presentations. It was first opened by the president 
of the AFJP Union, Sebastián Palla, who tried to minimize the grounds presented against the 
private scheme. As stated in hypothesis 2 one would expect the AFJPs to strongly advocate 
for the continuance of the scheme given their economic interests in the system. However his 
presentation was mainly directed to defending the scheme from the “attacks” rather than 
trying to convince the audience of its goodness, displaying the weakness of the AFJPs as 
advocators of the private scheme. He focused great part of his presentation on the myths that 
had been spreading around about the argentine fully funded system
60
, while trying to explain 
that the greatest problems regarding the implementation and evaluation of this system were 
inevitable to the shift from PAYG to fully funded, and not due to poor management. The 
public scheme became unfunded during the transition period creating imbalances in the 
public tier. And since this period was still ongoing the systems had never been able to be 
comparable as regards the level of benefits, which limited the analysis that was being 
presented in 2008
61
.  
 
To the end of his presentation, the president of the AFJP Union closed arguing that the 
elimination of the AFJPs would bring down one of the most important institutional investors 
in Argentina (Senate plenary sessions Day 2, 2, 5-6, 11-12). However, while simultaneously 
trying to defend it, he made evident a latent concern about the weaknesses of the funded 
scheme, especially regarding the international crisis. Illustrating the arguments stated in 
hypotheses 1 (perceived weaknesses of the funded scheme) and 7 (international crisis), the 
AFJPs’ representative highlighted that, for more than six months, there had been a project, 
                                                 
60
 (1) The State was subsidizing the private system with ARS 4 billion. This was in fact the part of the benefits 
the State had to cover for the years that the beneficiaries had contributed to the public system. (2) The fully 
funded system was not based on solidarity. The employers’ contributions related to those affiliated to the private 
system were destined to finance the public system. (3) Funds mismanagement. All investments were done 
according to law and supervised by the bodies created to that matter. (4) High levels of investment in public 
bonds. This was a consequence of the regulations established by the State. (5) High fees. They had been always 
according to international standards and, if at any point they were exceedingly high, they had been lowered to 
1% in 2007. (6) Investment losses reduced the capital accumulated in the accounts. The accumulation of funds 
absorbed both positive and negative impacts (Senate plenary sessions Day 2, 2; Decree 1572/2001, Section 4) 
61
 Those who were retiring through the private system in 2008 could have only contributed to it during 14 years; 
the rest had been paid to the State, who had no records of the individual contributions. 
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consented by both the government and the AFJPs, to modify the fully funded system by 
creating a second fund that shielded those members at the last stage or already retired in order 
to reduce the possible effect of market shocks (Ibid, 14).  
 
In addition to his presentation, he was asked to provide an overview of the funds with respect 
to the AFJPs stock portfolios and the potential control the State would gain over local 
companies as a consequence of the reform. This revealed there was concern among the 
legislators about the government’s intentions and the temptation the accumulated funds 
represented, illustrating the relevance of hypothesis 9 in explaining the U-turn. Palla 
explained that according to the regulations, each AFJP could not have more than 5% of a 
company’s equity, but in the accumulation of all investments, it was possible for the State to 
obtain some degree of control/participation
62
 (Ibid, 9) 
 
The second speaker was Guillermo J. Jáuregui, an expert lawyer in pension and retirement 
issues who was invited to present the situation concerning old age care in Argentina. The 
results he presented reveal themselves now relevant in terms of hypothesis 1 that stated that 
the perceived weaknesses the system had at that time were a significant factor weakening 
those opposed to the reform. According to Jauregui the failure of the funded system could be 
seen in its unfulfilled promises and the root for this to happen was found in its intrinsic 
defects. The former consisted of: (1) the unimproved level of coverage
63
; (2) the unveiled 
“lie” regarding  reduction of evasion and informal employment 64 ; (3) the not reduced 
administration costs given that fees and executives salaries were argued to be extraordinarily 
high; and (4) the lack of success in providing better level of benefits than the public system 
(Ibid, 21).  
 
The system’s intrinsic defects highlighted in the presentation, that is, the main cause for its 
failure, are now certainly a good example of why the scheme was perceived as weak. In the 
first place, the lawyer referred to the incompatibility of the objectives of a social security 
scheme with regards to market risks and its rationale. Attaching social risks to market risks is 
a direct consequence of a fully funded private pension design; still this is not desired when 
                                                 
62
 For a detail account of ANSeS’s potential shareholding see appendix 3 figure 8. 
63
 Figure 13 in appendix 4 shows that since both the amount of contributors and the number of employed people 
increased, the gap of uncovered workers stayed unchanged. See appendix 4 figure 14 and 16 for further 
documentation on the evolution of the coverage rate (Jáuregui 2008, 3-4) 
64
 According to Jáuregui, the total amount of workers in the informal market was of 6 million at the time of the 
debate in 2008. See appendix 4 figure 15 and 17 for further documentation (Jáuregui 2008, 5) 
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the objective is to provide more security. Secondly he argued that the fully funded system 
would have worked better within job stability and formality, that is, the high levels of work 
informality in Argentina constrained the affiliates, and the economical struggle reduced their 
coverage. Finally, Jauregui stated the fully funded system discriminated against women, who 
tend to have longer life expectancy, and against married men who have to provide for a wife 
or disabled children (Ibid, 21).  
 
Apart from perceiving the system as weak, to him it was also the AFJPs who had proven to 
be weak actors themselves. Jauregui thought these institutions had not been able to perform 
independently when the State forced them to buy public bonds, creating a private system 
were 65% of the investments consisted of these financial instruments (Ibid, 22). This adds to 
the understanding – as stated in hypothesis 2 – that the AFJPs were weak stakeholders who 
lack interest in advocating for the continuance of a scheme that would neither let them act 
“freely”65 nor satisfy their economic interests.   
 
The contradiction presented by the situation seemed to be that – as Jauregui pointed it out 
himself – the composition of the AFJPs portfolios created a scheme that was not that far away 
from a public one
66
, and so he questioned one more time the viability or significance of a 
private scheme with such low levels of diversification mostly investing on public bonds. 
Returning to the arguments of Orszag and Stiglitz (2001) and Barr (2002) presented in 
section 3.1, we can see here how the exposure to political risk was there even before the 
reform took place in the ways the government was regulating the private pension sector 
(Orszag and Stiglitz 2001, 37; N. A. Barr 2002, 3). Still, regardless of the negative 
characteristics of the funded system, Jauregui warned the senators that going back to the 
public system would still represent an old age care scheme subjected to demographic 
changes, and that should not be left unconsidered (Senate plenary sessions Day 2, 22) 
 
Day 3: 
The presentations held during the last day of the plenary sessions of the Senate committees 
provided more evidence about the fact that the 1994 scheme did not have many “fans” who 
would advocate for it. The old age care ombudsman of Buenos Aires openly expressed his 
                                                 
65
 Here I refer to the concept of a funded pension system run under the rules of a free market, which was 
supposed to be the feature to provide best outcomes – in terms of profits – to the covered population.  
66
 See appendix 3 figure 7 for further documentation on the composition of the fund as of 23/10/2008. 
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support to the reform and its objectives, so he encouraged the senators to vote positively. 
However he considered it as a just transitional measure which should pay attention to the 
high litigation levels the system already had (Plenary of Senate Committees Day 3 - Morning, 
2-12). 
 
The second speaker of that morning, the National Ombudsman
67
, superficially mentioned he 
acknowledged the private system was flawed, but especially called for the attention of the 
role of its supervisory body as responsible of looking after the system. Then he mostly 
focused his speech on raising awareness among the senators regarding the lack of structure 
ANSeS had in order to handle the magnitude of the system that was going to be transferred 
upon the approval of the bill. Therefore, he presented a suggestion to improve the proposed 
new pay-as-you-go DB scheme by creating of a special bank, comprehensively supervised, in 
charge of preserving the resources and paying the benefits (Ibid, 10-17).  
 
The afternoon sessions include the speech of three economists – Carlos Heller, Javier 
González Fraga and Oscar Cetrangolo – who were invited to present their opinions on the 
reform. All of them agreed the funded scheme had not been appropriate for Argentina, but 
that the way the new system was trying to be put in place was unfortunately not the correct 
one to get out of it. For example, Gonzalez Fraga – with some scepticism – explained that the 
“new” PAYG-DB system would create in the long term fiscal pressure due to the 
demographic trends and warned the congressmen the reform should have been more 
comprehensively planned (Bridger and Cado 2008). An interesting position, though, was that 
belonging to Carlos Heller who at the time was President of Banco Credicoop
68
, the principal 
shareholder of Previsol
69
 AFJP. He explained to the Senators that the organization he 
                                                 
67
 The Ombudsman is an independent authority, operating with full autonomy and without receiving instructions 
from any other authority. Its mission is the defense, protection and promotion of human and other rights, 
guarantees and interests sheltered under the Constitution of the Argentine Nation and the laws, in the face of 
deeds, acts or omissions of the Administration or other public services providers (Constitution of the Argentine 
Nation, section 86; Constitution of the City of Buenos Aires, Section 137) 
68
 Credicoop Bank is the largest cooperatively-owned bank in Argentina (Credicoop Bank website). 
69
 “On December 9, 2008, Law 26425 and the pertinent regulation decrees 2103, 2104 and 2105 were published. 
Such rules put an end to the “Sistema Integrado de Jubilaciones y Pensiones” (Argentine Integrated Social 
Security System) and thus, the unique and exclusive subject matter of the pension funds administrator agencies 
(A.F.J.P) came to an end as well. The law commanded the transfer by operation of law of the managed funds in 
favor of the “Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social” (Social Security National Agency) (A.N.Se.S). 
The national agency subrogated all the rights and liabilities the A.F.J.P. had. Consequently, from the law 
enactment onwards, any social security application or claim regarding thereto must be addressed to the ANSeS, 
the only administrator organism of the so called “Sistema Integrado Previsional Argentino” (S.I.P.A). In this 
frame, the company underwent a loss amounting to AR$40,067,206.68 pesos as a result or the economic impact 
the mentioned Social Security Reform caused. Anyhow, the Law 26425 that creates the “Sistema Integrado 
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represented had been against the 1994 reform from the beginning, but since its approval, they 
decided to create an AFJP that would be driven by their same cooperative principles (Plenary 
of Senate Committees Day 3 - Afternoon). Giving support to the statements in hypotheses 1 
and 2, these three speakers continue to illustrate how the funded scheme was very negatively 
perceived, to the extent that even some of its material interest stakeholders – who would have 
also invested some degree of prestige – were likely to express their support to a new reform 
in 2008.   
 
Committees’ reports 
From a total of 21 Senators participating of the committees sessions, the majority report was 
subscribed by 15 of them (14 belonging to FPV-PJ), with no modifications to the text 
approved in the House
70
.  
 
The alternatives to be debated upon in the Senate were three minority reports. The Socialist 
Party proposed to reject the project but replace it with an amended text with the same 
objective of eliminating the fully funded, defined-contribution, private system with a PAYG-
DB public one but with modifications in its operationalization. A little more conservative 
position was that of Civic Coalition and UCR who suggested vetoing (at least partially) the 
bill advising to create some body that would be in charge of starting a comprehensive process 
to reform the pension system (Senate Committees Report No1168 2008). The former 
proposal supported the idea in the project and the timing at which it should be done, but it 
disagreed with much of its content which, in terms of the legislative process, could not be 
considered a complete veto of the bill but a move that, if it gained supporters, would delay its 
approval and could modify its outcome. The latter proposal, even though it was for vetoing 
the bill, it did not defend the funded system either, it acknowledged the need for a deep 
reform but not the kind the Government was suggesting. Again, all reports were showing that 
lack of political support and advocacy towards the 1994 scheme that hypotheses 2 and 3 were 
claiming, especially motivated by its bad reputation as stated in hypothesis 1. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Previsional Argentino” (SIPA), under article 13, stipulates a regime intended to compensate those losses 
resulting from the Government decision, which has not been regulated yet by the Executive Power. The General 
Meeting passed the absorption of losses with AR$ 11,998,200 pesos of irrevocable capital contributions from 
shareholders which added to the remaining AR$259.38 pesos of capital adjustment. For that reason, the net loss 
shown in our Financial Statements amounted to AR$28,069,367.26 pesos. As of December 5th 2008, when the 
State took on the system, the Net Equity of the Pension and Retirement Fund, managed by Previsol AFJP, 
amounted to AR$ 2,063,891,205.17 pesos, corresponding to 370,625 accounts balances, Mutual Contribution 
Funds, and other contributions pending crediting” (Credicoop Bank 2009, 46-47) 
70
 The majority had one partial dissident that suggested some minor changes 
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Debate 
With the presentation of a preference motion
71
 on 5 November, the debate of the project in 
the Senate was scheduled for 20 November (Senate Bulleting No 18/08, 10). The session 
lasted 12 hours and was opened by the heads of the two committees advising the Senate. In 
first place spoke FPV-PJ Senator Miranda
72
 who, by referring to former President Nestor 
Kirchner’s platform, introduced the idea that since 2003 the government’s actions had been 
directed to achieve what the former Head of State had promised: the creation of a pension 
system based on solidarity, universalism, plurality, equity and sustainability (Senate Session 
20/11/2008 Transcript, 7).  
 
In this way his say provides some evidence to hypothesis 7 and the understanding of the 
international context that surrounded this process as explanation of the U-turn. Since if this 
was correct – and let’s assume it was – and the idea had been in the minds of the members of 
the Executive since 2003, it suggests it was just about the timing in which to present the 
project. In other circumstances it would not have been so effortless to pass the bill. 
 
Immediately after that, FPV-PJ Senator Rios
73
, representing those subscribing the majority 
report, stated their approach to the project had taken into account the large support obtained 
in the House of Representatives. For this reason, they were advocating for the approval of the 
bill with no modifications, in order to show the high level of consensus that was also present 
in the Senate. In addition, he pointed out the fact that even those who spoke during the 
committees’ sessions in opposition to the bill were either against or at least were not able to 
defend the 1994 scheme. Providing evidence of the lack of political support the private 
system had and illustrating the relative weight of hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 in explaining the 
reform. According to the Senator the private system had not only been unable to fulfil its 
goals in Argentina but in all Latin America. Because the conditions presented in these 
countries had been opposite to the ones required for the system to succeed: high income, 
stability and a developed economy (Senate Session 20/11/2008 Transcript, 7-9).  
 
                                                 
71
 A preference motion is aimed at determining or anticipating the debate of a project in the Senate or in the 
House of Representatives. The proposition is presented and subjected to voting during ordinary sessions. In case 
of approval, the bill has preferred treatment to other issues (Senate Rules and Regulations Section 143, 92; 
House of Representatives Rules and Regulations, Section 130, 22; Senate Rules and Regulations: Motions.) 
72
Vice President of the Committee on Labour and Social Security 
73
 President of the Committee on Budget and Finance 
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To close his argument, he went over three issues about the reform: (1) he explained the 
system was being reversed in that moment because the conditions were the accurate to do so 
due to the negative impact the crisis had had on market trends. Because according to him 
sometimes decisions need to be taken in the worst possible moments so that the cost and 
pressure of undoing something are the lowest. Illustrating how the concept of a window of 
opportunity presented in hypothesis 7 was of relevance to obtain support to the project, he 
expressed that if the reform had been presented one year before, the counter forces would 
have been higher, and therefore it would have been harder to get the reform approved. (2) He 
explained the reason why the process had to be so fast was linked to the speculative reactions 
upon the proposal which were dumping the value of the fund, providing an alternative 
perspective to the political culture argument in hypothesis 10. In this way he presented the 
politics of the pension reform as only a circumstantial happening and not the normal way of 
doing things. (3) Finally, he left opened the question about whether it was incorrect that the 
State recovered control over the funds and shielded itself against the international crisis. Still 
he insinuated that part of the reason why the Government was presenting the project was 
related to the acquisition of the funds and the financial struggles the country was about to 
face the following year, bringing some light onto the statements in hypotheses 8 and 9 
(Senate Session 20/11/2008 Transcript , 11-13). 
 
The open debate that followed had a similar dynamic as the one held at the House of 
Representatives: a weak opposition mostly arguing about the tempestuous manner this reform 
was being done, no defenders of the 1994 scheme, and a majority advocating for a PAYG-
DB scheme as superior to the flawed funded one and as a reasonable source of funding for 
the State. This resulted in no changes to the bill and led to its direct approval (Senate Session 
20/11/2008 Transcript, 14-156) 
 
Voting 
After 12 hours of debate, the Senate approved the pension reform Law 26.425 with no 
modifications made to the bill passed by the House of Representatives. Having plurality in 
the chamber
74
, FPV-PJ was able to gather the minimum required votes helped by some of the 
dissident peronists. In addition, other opposition parties supported the reform adding to a total 
of 46 positive votes. Eighteen negatives were counted, to which UCR contributed with 7. The 
                                                 
74
 FPV-PJ counted with 32 Senators – See table 3 to review the Senate composition and voting 
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Senate has a total of 72 members and the project needed the absolute majority of the 
members present to be approved, i.e. 33 out of the 65 present that day. Two of the senators 
seating and voting in 2008 had been present in the sessions in 1993. One of them was 
supporting the shift back to pay-as-you-go and the other was against it
75
 (Law 24.241 - 
Transcripts of the Legislative Process; Senate Session 20/11/2008 Transcript, 140-156).  
 
Senate voting 
Table 3 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Senate Session 20/11/2008 Transcript, Télam 
2008, the Senators history from the Senate official website, and the Argentine Judiciary 
official website
76
. 
 
5.4 Executive’s Promulgation and Publication in the Official Gazette 
Completing the legislative process, on 4 December, 2008 the Executive promulgated the Law 
26.245 as passed by the Senate. Both the Decree 2099/08 from the Executive and the 
approved text were published in the Official Gazette on 9 December, 2008, date in which the 
                                                 
75
 I did not have access to the detail account of votes in 1993. 
76
 See appendix 2 for the names in Spanish 
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law started ruling (Decree 2099/08; Official Publication of the ratified Law 24.425 2008;  
Law 26.425 Section 21, 4) 
 
5.5 In The Meantime in The Outside 
Throughout this presentation of the sequence of decisions that resulted in the U-turn some 
indicators of the relative weight of the hypotheses came along. However, there are some other 
facts that need to be considered in order to complete the description of the events, thus I will 
now turn to what was happening outside the Congress. 
 
Support and Opposition from Other Groups 
Although not previously mentioned given their lack of incumbency in the formal legislative 
process, other groups made their public statements, for and against, the reform. The 
appearance of these groups in the public scope is considered under this title to help determine 
the level of informal veto points (hypothesis 5) and the level of public support (hypotheses 1 
and 2) to this particular decision making process.  
 
The most salient was the support the main labour unions gave to the government’s initiative 
from the very beginning (Mindez 2008; Clarín (1) 2008). As a de facto veto player, Argentine 
unions had suffer a strong deterioration during the 1980s and 1990s given the de-unionization 
of the PJ party (Levitsky and Murillo 2008), however since 2001/2002 social mobilization 
had begun to grow again thanks to “the end of the long economic depression, the increase of 
production and economic activity, the decline of unemployment, and the political and 
economic project of the Government” (Atzeni and Ghigliani 2008) and by 2008 Unions 
showed to be a relevant political ally, not to say a very important non-enemy. In this way, the 
idea stated in hypothesis 5 loses some of its explanation power. That “permission” given to 
these nongovernmental actors in the policy making process was indeed not used as a threat to 
the success of the reform, but as a reinforcement.  
 
On the side of the opposing forces, the AFJP employees – with only little back up from 
independent people who were against the reform – demonstrated for several days during the 
Congress sessions, driven by the fear of not knowing what was going to happen with their 
employment stability once the AFJPs had disappeared (Página12 (1) 2008; Clarín (6) 2008; 
Bulrich 2008). Other attempts included meeting the vice President to express their concerns 
and insecurity about being employed by the State (La Nación (6) 2008) or publicly 
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threatening they would appeal against the reform (La Nación (8) 2008). However, none of 
their actions made a substantial impact. Already on 27 October – even before the billed had 
been approved – the Government called in the Unions and the AFJPs for a meeting to arrange 
the transfer and future of the workers (La Nación (7) 2008), showing how weak they were as 
stakeholders of the funded system and illustrating the relevance of hypothesis 2 in explaining 
the success of the U-turn.  
 
Another concerned group were the representatives of the rural producers who previously that 
year had vetoed another proposal from the Government. Although they lobbied against the 
reform they were not powerful enough to represent a veto threat (La Nación (9) 2008). The 
general public opinion, in contrast, seemed to have been slightly more in favour of the 
reform. A survey carried out by a local consulting firm (Analogías) determined that 66,5% 
thought the public system was more secure that the private and that 53,7% agreed with the 
transfer to the public system
77
 (Página12 (2) 2008; Página 12 (3) 2008). Finally, as for 
regional reaction, it is important to highlight the Brazilian Minister of Social Security praised 
the Argentine reform to be and expressed they would start bringing this issue to the rest of the 
MERCOSUR countries
78
 in order to converge in similar ways of pension provision (La 
Nación (10) 2008) . This support was given even when during the reform the AFJPs were 
required to repatriate the funds invested in Brazil (Stang 2008). 
 
AFJPs and the Reform 
The public reaction of the AFJPs should be described as rather divergent which indeed did 
not help defend the fully funded, defined-contribution, private system. Right after the project 
was announced the President of the AFJP Union stated that they would protect the ones 
enrolled under the private scheme (Clarín (2) 2008), and in order to express their 
disagreement with the reform the Union published a letter in the main Sunday newspapers. In 
reaction to this, NACIÓN AFJP (the State owned administrator) left the Union while two 
other AFJPs, PREVISOL
79
 and FUTURA, publicly stated they agreed at least partially with 
the reform (La Nación (1) 2008). 
                                                 
77
 The survey was done on 300 people between 25 and 74 years old living in Buenos Aires, and used CATI 
methodology. The sample covered an equal number of men and women; however up to 60% of the interviewed 
were not making any contributions and 17.7% were already pensioners. 
78
 The Mercosur countries are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru are associate members (MERCOSUR official website) 
79
 Previsol’s principal shareholder was Banco Credicoop whose President, Carlos Heller, was one of the 
speakers at the plenary of the Senate committees on 12 November, 2012 
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In addition to the letter, on 3 November the AFJP Union presented to the Executive an 
alternative proposal to modify the pension system without nationalizing it (Obarrio (1) 2008). 
However, this was immediately dismissed by the Government with strong critics (Clarín (3) 
2008), showing again – as claimed in hypothesis 2 – that the capacity of the AFJPs to stand 
by the funded system was almost none, both inside and outside the Congress.  
 
Still, the private administrators had to deal with multiple measures taken against them. 
Starting 21 October, given the presumption of fraud, the AFJPs were forbidden to operate in 
the stock market for a week
80
 (La Nación (2) 2008). During the following days they were 
repeatedly raided in order to determine whether funds had been mismanaged (Clarín (4) 
2008; Hauser 2008; La Nación (4) 2008; La Nación (5) 2008). And they were required to 
repatriate the funds (ARS 1.8 billion) invested in Brazil (Stang 2008) and in Mercosur (Clarín 
(5) 2008). Additionally, they had to deal with the actions taken by New York Federal Judge 
Thomas Griesa, who admitted the petitions presented by several U.S. investment funds on 30 
and 31 October to seize AFJPs funds, to freeze investments held by Argentine pension funds 
in the U.S. – in reaction to the move to nationalize the system81 (Clarín (7) 2008; Laudonia 
2008). 
 
Rumour Has It: the Government’s Intentions  
Since its presentation, the project was framed under the argument that old age care was a 
responsibility of – and therefore should be carried out by – the State. However, as time went 
by during the legislative process, some signs of other intentions began to show up. Already 
two days after the announcement was made and even though it was not officially disclosed, in 
Casa Rosada (Government House) there were some who admitted that the transferred funds 
would not remain frozen. Yet, they would be used to cover up the following year’s deficit and 
avoid defaulting (La Nación (11) 2008). However, official versions of the destiny of the 
funds stated they would be allocated in public works planned for the following year (Obarrio 
(2) 2008) and invested in long term labour intensive projects that would help sustain 
Argentina’s economy during the global crisis (La Nación (12) 2008). 
 
                                                 
80
 The legal actions pursued against AFJPs to forbid the companies of operating in the stock market for a week 
were withdrawn on 24 October, allowing the administrators to restart operations the following Monday (La 
Nación (3) 2008). 
81
 This issue would not have been resolved but until after the pension system had been nationalized. 
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Other rumours talked about the participation that the State was going to gain in the boards of 
some important companies. Examples of these were Edenor
82
, Gas Natural Ban
83
, Banco 
Macro
84
, Siderar
85
, Telecom
86
, BBVA Banco Francés
87
, Galicia
88
 and IRSA
89
, among others. 
According to the official reports
90
 some of the companies were going to have the State as the 
first minority shareholder (La Nación (11) 2008). In response to this, some companies 
expanded their share buyback program (La Nación (14) 2008) showing their unwillingness in 
having the Government interfering in their operations.  
 
The rumours presented here suggest that, regardless of the efforts on emphasising the 
objective of the reform was to enhance solidarity, inclusiveness and redistribution, material 
interests on gaining control over capital was perceived as a real temptation by many of the 
actors involved. 
 
6 Discussion, Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 Discussion: Analyzing the Clues  
Up until now, I have presented what happened inside and outside the Congress during those 
36 hectic days of the policy formulation process that led Argentina to shift back to a pay-as-
you-go pension system. Now it is the time to evaluate whether the clues found are consistent 
enough to confirm or deny the hypotheses presented in section 3.3. Thus, in order to address 
the research question – Why did Argentina change its pension system back to a one-tiered pay 
as you go DB system in 2008? – I have to return to the hypotheses to be able to determine 
their relative importance in explaining what went on, how and why.  
 
At the beginning of this paper, I presented the statement of Estelle James which I would like 
to quote one more time: 
Private management of pension reserves minimizes opportunities for appropriation 
by the government. To be sure, no system is completely immune to the dangers 
described above, and every system will function better if government behaves. But 
the structure we have recommended [mandatory, fully funded-DC pensions managed 
                                                 
82
 Largest distributor of electricity in Argentina (Edenor official website). 
83
 Second largest distributor of gas in Argentina (Gas Natural Ban official website). 
84
 Largest domestically-owned private bank in Argentina (Banco Macro official website). 
85
 Largest steel manufacturer in Argentina (Siderar official website). 
86
 One of the major local telecommunications companies in Argentina (Telecom official website). 
87
 One of the leaders in the Argentine Financial market (Banco Francés official website). 
88
 One of the leaders in the Argentine Financial market (Banco Galicia official website). 
89
 One of Argentina’s leading real estate companies in terms of total assets (IRSA official website). 
90
 See appendix 3 figure 8 for further documentation. 
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by private institutions] contains checks and balances that place limits on each actor. 
We believe such a system is less susceptible to distortions and more sustainable 
(James 1996, 4, 12-13).  
 
The questions asked in relation to this statement and Argentina’s U-turn in pension politics 
were: (a) why did the mandatory, fully funded, defined-contribution, private pension system 
in Argentina not place such “checks and balances” on political actors to the extent that they 
would never interfere to dramatically change pension design again? And (b) why has 
dramatic pension reform been possible also after 1994? The answer to these questions is also 
the answer to my research question, as follows. 
 
Throughout the body of this dissertation we have witnessed how different actors on the basis 
of different premises or frameworks perceived the funded scheme as flawed (H1). Likely, 
those could be summarized as Arza (2008) presented them in an evaluation of the results of 
the multi-pillar system done shortly before the reform took place: (1) the private pension 
system’s viability became more uncertain – compared to what it had been initially defined –
due to the pressure the transition period was creating. In addition, doubts about its 
sustainability began to appear. Although the system was no longer being affected by 
demographic changes because benefits could be well adjusted to the accumulated funds, the 
benefits were more strongly attached to market performance and “the ability of governments 
to contain the political and social costs of crises on benefit levels” (Arza 2008, 2699-2700). 
(2) Preventing old age poverty and providing universal coverage had not been successful. 
Given the high levels of informal work (i.e. contribution evasion) and the low level of non-
contributory benefits many people remained uncovered and poverty alleviation had not been 
properly addressed (Ibid, 2700-2701). (3) Old age income security was expected to increase, 
while administrative costs were to reduce, however this was not the case. In terms of the 
former, the new set of risks – management, investment and annuity risks – and the prevalence 
of macroeconomic risks – particularly inflation and the country’s instability – seemed not to 
have reduced insecurity but to change its nature. With reference to the latter, the reform 
resulted in a higher total cost derived from (a) a more expensive private tier in comparison 
with the public one due to reduced economies of scale and the increase in marketing costs, 
and (b) the transition costs (Ibid, 2701-2703). (4) Although at first sight contribution returns 
increased in comparison with PAYG’s theoretical performance, if the former were to be 
corrected by transition costs, new risks and administrative costs, the results would have 
shown a worse off situation for the private scheme (Ibid, 2703-2705). (5) “Perverse” 
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redistribution was expected to be eliminated but, on the contrary, the system created new 
inequality problems mostly related to the predominance of work informality, financial 
fluctuations and the double burden
91
 of the transition (Ibid, 2705-2706). (6) Boosting 
individual choice and competition remained a desired aim. The rigidity and limitations of the 
system plus the underdeveloped legal framework prevented these two objectives from being 
achieved (Ibid, 2706-2708). (7) Finally, reduction of political risk appeared to be unlikely 
even before the system was dismantled in 2008 (Ibid, 2705).   
 
The facts presented by the author showed a latent hazard to the continuity of the funded 
scheme and that was very well illustrated by the fact that (a) all committees’ reports stated the 
private tier needed reviewing; (b) during debates, none of the legislators defended the private 
tier and almost all legislators had a negative perception of the way it was operating; (c) the 
Executive presented its argument by proposing the new reform and criticising the old scheme 
throughout the whole legislative process inside and outside the Congress; (d) the public 
opinion – pictured in the survey – showed generalized dislike over the private scheme; (e) the 
different experts that assessed the legislators presented the dimensions in which the scheme 
was malfunctioning; and (f) even some AFJPs believed that there were adjustments needed to 
the current system or that the proposed reform was appropriate. Distrust in the funded system 
was generalized, and that attempted against it, because if there had been an interest actually 
jeopardized by the 2008 reform, there would have also been an interest in keeping the private 
scheme.  
 
The affiliates(H2) had mainly three mechanisms available for indirect participation in the 
process: through their representatives in the House – who are directly elected by the people –, 
the Ombudsmen – representing the interests of the public – and the labour Unions – who have 
proven to promote legislation or undertake lobbying favourable to the interests of their 
members or workers as a whole. Looking at the first actors we find that the affiliates of the 
funded scheme were partly represented by just a small number of legislators, whose line of 
argument was based on the reform being unconstitutional. Still, the violation of property 
rights as an argument to advocate for the affiliates was easily jumped over as we have seen 
earlier in section 5.1. The positions of the Ombudsmen were divided. While one was openly 
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 The double burden refers to the fact that during the transition time the current workers have to pay twice to 
maintain the system running. The first payment corresponds to financing their individual account. The second is 
given by the increase in taxes in order to finance the remaining PAYG tier (Barr and Diamond 2009, 20)  
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supporting the reform, the other – although not supporting it – was mainly focused on its 
better implementation. Finally, the labour unions did not have a very active role in this 
particular debate; rather they just expressed their support to the Executive’s proposal from the 
very beginning. Indeed, there was not much resistance to the reform from this group. 
  
The AFJPs(H2) on the other hand were a little more active in trying to keep the funded 
scheme, but still did not seem to make a substantial pressure to gain supporters. They were 
the target of several negative actions that most probably weakened their position. They were 
even perceived as weak by some of the actors involved in the decision making process. They 
were given time to expose their case before the legislators during the committees meetings. 
However, the presentations seemed mostly a formality and a way for the legislators to dig 
into the state of the funds in order to address improvements for the new policy. Their public 
defence was even erratic, divided and disorganized, different voices did speak up, however in 
opposite directions, even in favour of the reform. Unsuccessfully, some of them tried to act as 
advocates of the beneficiaries, but their already damaged image did not help convince any 
legislators, probably because of the conflict of interests that was contained in that 
manifestation. Other representation bodies, presumably less biased, had already promoted a 
different approach towards the defence of the beneficiaries, prioritizing social over individual 
values
92
.    
 
Given the link of hypothesis 3 with some of the findings related to hypothesis 6, I will present 
it afterwards and will now jump over to hypothesis 4. 
  
As introduced in hypothesis 4, the veto player theory considers three aspects to determine the 
level of policy stability of a country: the number of players the system has, the level of 
congruence of the players and the level of cohesion of collective players (Tsebelis 1995, 301-
302, 308-313). In general terms, the relevance of this theory in explaining the U-turn should 
have been related with the presence of minority actors strongly opposed to the reform, as well 
as with the way these minorities would have been able to use their veto power to block the 
project and keep the status quo. As already presented in the previous paragraphs, this was not 
the case during the debate in 2008. Leaving this theory with less explanatory power regarding 
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 For example, the positions of the old age ombudsman of Buenos Aires and the unions.  
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the events here analyzed. Still, the theory enables us to do a – rather superficial93 – analysis 
of the level of policy stability (H4) in Argentina’s policy making process. 
     
Argentina’s policy making process has – in terms of this theory – only three institutional veto 
players
94
: The House of Representatives, The Senate and the Executive. However, provided 
that a veto point that is able to be overridden should not be counted, only the 2 veto points 
belonging to the chambers remain (Tsebelis 1995, 305-306).  The level of congruence 
between these two players – i.e. the distance between their policy positions – is determined 
by the composition of the House of Representatives and the Senate as described in section 
4.2. The more similar they are in their composition, the higher the level of congruence. This 
is clearly the case of the Argentine Congress in 2008. Furthermore, given the high level of 
resemblance, I will argue here that the absorption rule
95
 applies, thus having to count both 
players as one (Ibid, 309-310). Finally, the level of cohesion of the opposition groups was 
rather low provided their division and weakness. This situation was described in section 4.2 
and was also illustrated in the standpoints presented during the debate of this particular 
matter. The arguments exposed by the legislators – and the parliamentary groups they 
represented – showed a rather high level of cohesion of those supporting the reform. The 
opposition instead, could not find a strong argument that would let them act jointly. They 
were disorganized and weak.  
 
In terms of informal veto points (H5), we find very weak players. Although the AFJPs’ 
employees mobilized against the reform, their marginal power was not supported by national 
trade unions, who instead expressed their support to a shift back to the previous scheme, 
while other potential informal veto players were also very weak as shown in section 5.5. In 
this way, veto players theory – both formal and informal – only provides a limited 
understanding of the events in 2008.  Yet, one could say that the low level of policy stability 
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 For reasons of space and relevance to this paper I will not present an in-depth analysis of Argentina’s level of 
policy stability considering all the propositions made by Tsebelis in his book (Tsebelis 2001). 
94
 In terms of partisan veto players, one could say that the Front for Victory electoral alliance and the fact that 
Cristina Kirchner’s Vice-President belonged to UCR gave birth to a government coalition. Yet, this coalition 
was non-enforceable: the parties participating in government could not prevent their own legislators from 
defecting when the bill was treated in Congress, thus not creating any partisan veto players (Tsebelis 1995, 302).   
95
 The absorption rule states that when the composition of two chambers is identical, the players are identical 
and thus should be counted as one. Moreover, in the cases of federal states like the case of Argentina, 
legislatures should not be counted as two players when the electoral results had created identical majorities in 
both chambers (Tsebelis 1995, 309-310). If we go back to title 4.2 we can see that in both chambers the bloc 
with the highest number of legislators was that of Front for Victory with 127 (49,61%) representatives and 32 
senators (44,44%) together with the presence of allies in other parties that resulted from the electoral alliance. 
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– founded on the presence of just one non-cohesive institutional (or two with high level of 
congruence) veto player and the absence of any strong informal veto players – facilitated the 
reform were passed easily in 36 days.  
 
The sixth proposition puts the IMF and the World Bank as possible interested actors in a 
successful and sustainable experience of the Argentine fully-funded, defined-contribution, 
private scheme regarding their role in its implementation. Nonetheless, the relationship the 
country had with those said to be external stakeholders (H6) of this design had indeed 
changed in the years previous to the 2008 shift back to pay-as-you-go. Probably the most 
significant event happened in 2005 when the IMF was paid off in full by Argentina (Balch 
2005). At that time the Government argued the move would provide “greater degree of 
freedom in three areas: management of public accounts, macroeconomic strategy and income 
redistribution” (Katz 2005, 1). In this regard, one could say that this move away from these 
institutions’ recommendations – the shift back to pay-as-you-go – could be interpreted as 
evidence of that statement. However, I shall be a bit more conservative and simply state that 
the story of the U-turn in 2008 would not have been the same if Argentina had still been tied 
to loan conditionalities from the IMF.  
 
Moving away from the financial perspective, in the case of the World Bank one could think 
that the prestige invested by the agency in Argentina’s pension design would have created 
sufficient interest to, at least, try to influence the new policy. However, along the reviewed 
facts no involvement from the bank was revealed. The hypothesis presented here was 
formulated under the premise that the agency’s influence to shift to a funded system would 
have been proactively pursued taking into consideration the recommendation made by Estelle 
James as previously cited. However, according to Brooks (2004) during the design and 
approval phases in Argentina the World Bank had little control over the chosen outcomes. 
This was because the Bank’s objective was “to ensure an efficient and effective institutional 
reform” and not “to compel governments to adopt a more private model for social security 
than they desired” (75-76). The role of the IMF on the contrary was more of a catalyser of the 
reform as an instrument of political negotiation in the legislature providing the biding nature 
of its fulfilment. Bearing in mind the overall scenario, the author’s conclusion about the 
Argentine case is that these institutions “had a less active role than the domestic government 
actors in shaping the specific design of the Argentine reform, and only contributed to the 
adoption of a multi-pillared pension system through indirect support of the government’s 
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broad neoliberal economic strategy” (Ibid, 86-87). So, if we now consider the new local 
scenario of economic recovery, stabilization and the systematic compliance with both the 
IMF and the World Bank
96
, it would not seem outrageous not to find any evidence of their 
participation in the reform in 2008. It is however not clear whether their lack of participation 
was directly caused by the financial compliance or by their lack of prestige investment in 
1993/1994. Still, in either case, it could not be incorrect to assume that one of the reasons the 
U-turn was possible in such a straightforward fashion was thanks to the non-interference of 
these institutions.  
  
In order to identify the existence of the political prestige (H3) invested in the funded scheme 
by the legislators in the 1994 reform, I need to refer to the discussion on the influence that 
external stakeholders had on it. The results found about the roles of the IMF and the World 
Bank in the Argentine experience show that the reform encompassed two concepts, divisions 
of a dichotomy: the design chosen vs. the political decision made, that is, the act of reforming 
in itself. According to Brooks (2004), the design chosen had local ownership, while the 
decision of reforming was more externally influenced since there is little evidence that the 
support to a particular pension design had been dependent to loans and their conditionalities 
(75). However, this was not the way it was perceived locally. In 2008, the case – reflected in 
the discourses of many legislators – was presented as if the country had not had a real choice 
in 1993/1994, as if they had not had real ownership. This situation was reinforced by the fact 
that the members of the Congress had almost completely changed from one reform to 
another; showing that, as it will be discussed later, there might be something in the political 
culture and the internal dynamics of the parties that enabled this radical change; because 
ownership, neither perceived nor real – from either internal or external actors – had created 
much prestige so as to stop the U-turn. 
 
The argument based on the impact of the global crisis (H7) over the fully funded, defined-
contribution, private pension scheme was certainly a relevant and influential one that helped 
gain much political support in favour of the reform in 2008. According to its advocators the 
environment was conditioning the survival of the social security arrangement, and therefore it 
had to be reformed, showing also how perception regarding policy making is one element of 
relevance in defining what the problem is (Halvorsen 2006, 1288-1289). The way the 
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 By 2005, besides paying off the IMF, Argentina had been also cancelling its debt with IADB and the World 
Bank, making it a total disbursement of 25 billion dollars (Katz 2005, 3)   
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international crisis was perceived is for this matter – the understanding of the reasons for the 
shift back to a pay-as-you-go design – more significant than whether the crisis was indeed 
objectively a threat. Many legislators claimed the future of the private funds was exposed to a 
risk that could and should be avoided and this statement was stressed by the fact that the 
funded scheme was already malfunctioning and too vulnerable. The evidence found through 
this research cannot really determine what would have happened with the funded scheme if it 
had not been reformed and that should be left to further investigation. But it does bring light 
into the fact that the international crisis – as a situational factor – was an important driver in 
the debate that led to the U-turn of the pension system in Argentina. 
 
The key in determining whether the return to the pay-as-you-go design could also be related 
to the issue of who should control national capital (H9) in Argentine society, as well 
perceived as a solution to the money shortage (H8) the country was going through, refers to 
how the role of the State was defined – by the Government and the legislators – generally, 
regarding the economic management of the country, and particularly, regarding pension 
management. The project was supported by the argument that the State is who should provide 
old age care and that the system should enhance the concepts of solidarity, inclusiveness and 
redistribution. Still, inside and outside the Congress, rumours about additional interests 
started to grow. During the committees and floor debates the issue started to be talked about 
and it began to show itself as a reason for adherence to the reform from some members of the 
opposition. For them it was a better choice to deposit trust and funds in the hands of the 
Government rather than in the hands of the profit-driven corporations that were just looking 
to take advantage of them and that had created a system that had excessive costs and low 
levels of risk diversification. Two concepts that in the beginning were not very well 
perceived started to change their course. Members of the government began to openly display 
the future projects and allocations for the funds, and those derived objectives gained 
legitimacy, in part helped by the financial shortages forecasted for the following years. In this 
way, financial temptations and financial struggles became the “combo” that helped gain 
supporters at the time of the voting. 
 
Apart from the level of policy stability, there also seems to be something in the political 
culture (H10) of the policy making process that shapes it and further helps explain why it was 
possible for the Justicialist Party to pass this bill so rapidly, dismantle the system that the 
same party had put in place and still avoid problems inside the party. The hypothesis 
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questioned whether there was a cultural acceptance for interference and fast manoeuvring that 
allowed for this to happen, and – to a certain extent – the answer is affirmative. Considering 
Scherlis’s (2008) conception presented in section 4.2 regarding that new way of doing 
politics – the political machinery born during the late 1980s and 1990s, that was further 
consolidated during 2000s – the circumstances were such that politicians were allowed to be 
more flexible in their strategies. This was making it possible to “adapt to changing 
conditions, modifying programmatic commitments and switching policy programmes [...] 
without risking internal crisis” (579-583). According to the author, the key for such 
unquestioning political support was the control over the access to material resources. 
Whether or not the Executive had been able to enhance this political machine or even use it in 
order to engage legislators in supporting the 2008 reform, is not quite explicit in the findings. 
Hence, the political culture hypothesis here only helps explain how these types of practices 
create a certain environment that facilitates the approval of governmental projects but does 
not directly explain the U-turn.  
 
Still, despite the creation of a more flexible – and less institutionalized – party system 
(Scherlis 2008, 580), this transformation in the Argentine political culture does account for 
other matters that ultimately also help explain the U-turn: (a) the fact that party discipline can 
still be very high in Argentine politics provided that the legislators’ engagement in political 
entrepreneurship is partly determined by how party leaders in congress are able to allocate 
resources (Jones 2002, 158-159) and (b) why the level of reputation within PJ – regarding the 
fully funded, defined-contribution, private pension scheme – was so low, as discussed above. 
Moreover, when analysing the discourses presented by many legislators, one could see real 
concerns about the funded system and therefore a genuine agreement with the Executive’s 
standpoint. The circumstances (in particular the international crisis) and the state of the 
private system were such that there was more openly expressed ownership about dismantling 
it than what it seemed to have been when it was put in place. For that reason, the pro-
administration legislators’ position would not just be about accepting interference and fast 
manoeuvring but embracing it, agreeing with it and taking it to a level where party discipline 
would play a secondary role. 
 
But it would have not been enough that the system was not working properly if there had not 
been a viable alternative (H11). Many speakers talked about having doubts about the ANSeS 
being able to manage the new PAYG-DB scheme, being able to provide the benefits that the 
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Government was promising. Many opposed to the project on the basis that the proposed bill 
was not comprehensive enough. There were also those who claimed the new bill damaged the 
property rights gained by those who had chosen the funded over the public arrangement. And 
many made alternative proposals. But, to different extents the majority – those who voted in 
favour of the reform – agreed the fully funded, defined-contribution, private scheme needed 
to be replaced, and in that sense some definitions needed to be reconsidered and some 
sacrifices needed to be made. It was in that sense that many agreed on an ample 
conceptualization of property right when referring to pension benefits and many other took a 
pragmatic viewpoint that understood the reform as a first step forward into a better pension 
system. Here it seemed that, in general, participants – in and outside the decision making 
process – were more willing to cope with political risk than with market risks. That was what 
made the proposal more viable than the system in place. 
 
6.2 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Two sets of factors enabled the U-turn in Argentine pension policy: (a) factors weakening 
those opposing the U-turn and (b) factors strengthening those advocating for the U-turn. 
These were explored and identified throughout this dissertation, arriving to the conclusion 
that ultimately explains the happening. It was the combination of these factors and the 
different degrees to which they influenced the outcome what created the circumstances under 
which this dramatic shift took place.  
 
To a large extent, the U-turn is explained by the fact that the fully funded, defined-
contribution, private pillar of the Argentine pension system was negatively perceived by 
almost all actors. This was a major weakening factor for the opposition, who were not able to 
fully subscribe for a continuance of the status quo due to the fact that they were too 
dissatisfied with it. And those who could have been expected to be potential opponents/veto 
players of the reform – material interest groups, political prestige stakeholders or influential 
groups – were either weak, not interested or absent in advocating for the funded scheme and 
therefore presenting a low level of resistance. This situation was also helped by the low level 
of policy stability that the Constitution and electoral results had created. And by the fact that, 
externally speaking, by 2008 the “prestige/investing” ties with the IMF and the World Bank – 
due to financial help or technical assistance – were not there, and that provided the 
government with a clear path to work on a shift back to a pay-as-you-go DB public scheme 
without any external interference.  
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The main argument that allowed the Executive gain supporters was the constitutional 
delegation to the State of the obligation of granting old age care in Argentine society, and the 
ideas and values underpinning a redistributional and solidaristic pay-as-you-go pension 
design. Also, because the alternative proposed bill was presented in a way that defeated the 
argument about the violation of property rights. And it was regarded by both the government 
and the majority in the legislature as a good strategy towards a better management of the 
national capital and a pragmatic solution for the financial shortages the country was about to 
face. Contextually, the idea of a potential threat that could destroy the funds accumulated in 
the individual accounts leveraged all arguments, twisting the debate and accelerating it. 
Finally, even if not proven as a direct cause, the reform could not but have been helped by the 
presence of a culture that is said to allow rapid and dramatic policy changes without 
jeopardizing the integrity of the organizations that comprise the system.  
 
The research question – Why did Argentina change its pension system back to a one-tiered 
pay as you go DB system in 2008? – is finally answered by multiple factors that coexisted 
and interacted allowing the occurrence of a U-turn in Argentine pension politics. By 
exploring and testing a series of 11 hypotheses I have not only reached an understanding and 
explanation for the dramatic shift in pension design that took place in 2008, but also I was 
able to locate key aspects towards the understanding of Argentine social policy and the 
drivers and dynamics of the different political actors involved in this particular field: (a) the 
effect that changes in public representations of social problems have over the sustainability of 
their associated social arrangements. (b) The transformations in the private-public mix that 
have been happening in Argentine society since 2003, and the development of a different 
understanding of role of the State. (c) The multidimensional feature of social policy – and in 
particular old age care – and the way the various dimensions are prioritized and discussed 
upon during the policy formulation process, leading to a certain “consensual” understanding 
of what the problem is and how it should be solved. (d) The impact that certain aspects of 
political cultures – such as the presence of machine politics or ideology – may have over 
policy and the process of policy change, influencing arguments and final outcomes. (e) The 
shaping role of institutions and electoral results in the whole policy making process. (f) The 
new map of international relationships, in particular with the IMF and the World Bank. (g) 
And how local and international contexts create certain settings that can affect the views of 
all actors involved.    
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The approach used in this case study, assenting with Schludi (2005), is underpinned by the 
understanding that the analysis of such an intricate happening – such dramatic shift – requires 
the fusion of several perspectives (65), hopefully contributing to the academic field regarding 
the challenges of social theory when explaining policy change. In this way, by addressing the 
research question at various theoretical levels and combining political, economical, social and 
cultural perspectives the case shows its multidimensional complexity that cannot be reduced 
to one explanatory theory of policy change. Yet, the analysis of how the findings in this 
dissertation may allow improvements in already established theories is though left to future 
investigation.   
 
Closing up, I would like to refer to the argument that states that pension systems should not 
be reformed or that even any attempt to change pension programs is synonym of political 
suicide (Buchanan 1983, 340). The Justicialist Party in Argentina did it two times in a very 
short period of time: once in 1993/1994 and the second in 2008. Whether the last change was 
the correct move or not should be left for further research. Still, the sustainability of the new 
pay-as-you-go scheme and the renown consequences related to future demographic changes 
will not show up for several years and that would be a challenge to be faced by another 
Government.  
 
In any case, the Argentine experience shows that pension reforms can be carried out and that 
the implementation of private systems does not minimize opportunities for appropriation by 
the government as it was alleged by the World Bank. The question is now whether there 
could be other countries encouraged to follow the same lead and/or waiting for the right 
opportunity to do so. The likelihood that this event could be replicated in other countries 
given the constraints the global economic crisis has created is an interesting case to be 
addressed in the future. And hopefully this dissertation could help provide the initial data to 
carry out a comparative analysis with other countries that had been part of the same 
privatization process during the 1990s and 2000s. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Overview of the Multipillar Pension System 
The system’s principal financial resources were provided by employees (11 % of their gross 
salary)
97
; employers (12% of the gross salaries); and the self-employed who had an overall 
contribution of 27%. For each insured person who had shift to the private tier 11% was the 
amount capitalized in its individual account managed by a Retirement and Pension Funds 
Administrator (AFJP), while the remaining amount and the contributions of those who chose 
to stay in the old (but reformed) public system was destined to support the public tier which 
was still administered by the National Social Security Administration (ANSeS)
98
.   
 
Benefits were, by the same token, of two kinds: (1) a minimum pension benefit (Basic 
Universal Pension – PBU), together with a complementary compensation (Compensatory 
Pension – PC), for the years contributed to the public system prior to the reform, and an 
additional benefit (Additional Pension for Permanence – PAP) – for the years contributed to 
the public system after the reform – were granted by the State. This was calculated based on 
the average of the last 10 years of work salaries. (2) The funded tier’s benefits consisted of 
the PBU and the PC granted by the State and a pension based on the amounts contributed (the 
compulsory 11% and the additional voluntary contributions) plus the resulting investment 
earnings. Alternatively, pensioners could choose the accumulated assets to be provided as an 
annuity (where death risk was assumed by the insurance company hired by the pensioner), a 
programmed retirement (a monthly amount, annually pre-arranged with the AFJP, on the 
basis of the accumulated assets and the life expectancy of the retiree and the family group. In 
this case the risk of death was assumed by the retiree, therefore any remaining balances 
would have been considered part of the deceased property) or a “factionary retirement” (in 
which the beneficiary and AFJP settled an amount to be perceived only when the retiree 
reached a benefit of 50% – or lower – of the maximum PBU. The funded fraction of his/her 
pension became, in consequence, equal to that percentage until the account was consumed) 
(Deloitte Argentina 2006).  
 
 
 
                                                 
97
 This percentage was temporarily reduced to 5% and 7% due to economic constraints and later returned to 11% 
(Deloitte Argentina 2006; FIEL 2005, 103) 
98
 Figure 1 in section 1.1 presents the structure of the two-tiered pension system. 
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Appendix 2: Definitions, acronyms, translations and abbreviations 
 
Political Parties and Parliamentary groups
99
 
Bloc for the truth = Bloque por la Verdad 
Bloc of the Concertation = De la Concertación 
Buenos Aires for all in South Project = Bs. As. para Todos en Proyecto Sur 
Civic and Social Front = Frente Cívico y Social de Catamarca 
Civic Coalition = Coalición Cívica 
Civic Coalition-ARI-GEN-UPT = Coalición Cívica-ARI-GEN-UPT (House Inter-bloc among 
deputies of three parties: CC-ARI, GEN and UPT) 
Civic Coalition-Support for an Egalitarian Republic = Coalición Cívica-Afirmación para una 
República Igualitaria (CC-ARI)** 
Civic Front for Santiago = Frente Cívico por Santiago 
Democrat from Mendoza = Demócrata de Mendoza 
Dialogue for Buenos Aires = Diálogo por Buenos Aires 
Entre Rios Consensus  = Concertación Entrerriana 
Federal Consensus = Consenso Federal 
Federalist Union Party = Partido Unidad Federalista* 
Front for Citizens' Rights = Frente por los Derechos Ciudadanos 
Front for Everyone = Frente de Todos 
Front for Victory = Frente para la Victoria (FPV-PJ) (Pro-administration parliamentary 
group representing the Justicialist Party).  
Front of Production and Labour = Frente Producción y Trabajo 
Independent Movement = Movimiento Independiente 
Justicialist Front for National Liberation = Frejuli 
Justicialist Party = Partido Justicialista (PJ) (ruling party)*  
Liberal Party of Corrientes = Partido Liberal de Corrientes* 
Memory and Democracy = Memoria y Democracia 
National Justicialist = Justicialista Nacional 
National Union = Nacional Sindical 
Neuquén People's Movement = Movimiento Popular Neuquino (MPN)*  
                                                 
99
 The two kinds are considered here under the same title to avoid repetition when party and parliamentary 
groups have the same name. The cases that the name corresponds to both a political party and a parliamentary 
group are indicated as such, the rest are only parliamentary groups. The translations are of my own elaboration 
based on some accepted translations found in different sources. 
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New Party = Partido Nuevo* 
New Party against Corruption = Nuevo Contra la Corrupción* 
Party of the Concertation-FORJA = Partido de la Concertación-FORJA 
Peronist Dignity = Dignidad Peronista 
Peronist Guard = Guardia Peronista 
Popular and Social Encounter  = Encuentro Popular y Social 
Radical Civic Union = Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) (main opposition party)*  
Recreate for Growth = Recrear para el Crecimiento 
Renewal Party  = Partido Renovador* 
Republican Force = Fuerza Republicana* 
Republican Justicialism = Justicialismo Republicano 
Republican Proposal = Propuesta Republicana (PRO)*  
Salta Renewal Party = Partido Renovador de Salta (PRS)*  
Socialist Party  = Partido Socialista* 
Solidarity and Equality-ARI (T.D.F.) = Solidaridad e Igualdad (SI)*  
Support for an Egalitarian Republic = Afirmación por una República Igualitaria (ARI)  
Union Blue and White = Unión Celeste y Blanco* 
Union, Justice and Freedom Front = Frente Justicia Unión y Libertad 
Viable Santiago Movement = Movimiento Santiago Viable* 
 
*Bloc and political party. 
**Here only presented as political party 
 
Pension related terms 
Additional Pension for Permanence (PAP – Prestación Adicional por Permanencia): An 
additional benefit – provided to the PAYG beneficiaries – for the years contributed to the 
public system after the 1994 reform (Deloitte Argentina 2006). 
Argentine Integrated Retirement System (SIPA – Sistema Integrado Previsional 
Argentino):  pension system created by the 2008 Argentine pension reform. It is a publicly 
managed, single-tiered pension system provided in a pay-as-you-go defined benefits fashion 
(Law 26.425). 
Argentine National Social Security Administration (ANSeS – Administración Nacional 
de la Seguridad Social) 
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Basic Universal Pension (PBU – Prestación Básica Universal): Minimum pension benefit 
provided by the PAYG public system (Deloitte Argentina 2006). 
Compensatory Pension (PC – Prestación compensatoria): A complementary 
compensation – provided to the PAYG beneficiaries – for the years contributed to the public 
system prior to the 1994 reform (Deloitte Argentina 2006). 
Defined benefits (DB) pension: where benefits were calculated upon the “worker’s history 
of pensionable earnings”   (Barr and Diamond 2009, 8). 
Defined contribution (DC) pension: a pension arrangement where the benefits are 
determined by the value of the accumulated funds in individual accounts (Barr and Diamond 
2009, 8). 
Fully funded pension: a pension arrangement where payments are done out of funds that are 
previously accumulated (Gillion, et al. 2000, 710). 
Integrated Retirement and Pensions System (SIJP – Sistema Integrador de Jubilaciones 
y Pensiones): The two-tiered arrangement implemented in Argentina 1994 and inspired by 
the World Bank’s recommendations contained in the work Averting the Old Age Crisis 
(World Bank 1994) 
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension: a pension scheme where benefits are paid out of current 
contributions and taxes (Gillion, et al. 2000, 710) 
Retirement and Pension Funds Administrators (AFJPs – Administradoras de Fondos de 
Jubilaciones y Pensiones): The private social security institutions created by the 1994 
system reform were the operative/executive actors in charge of identifying insured people and 
employers and of the management of contributions, benefits and funds (Law 24.241) 
 
 
Other terms 
Argentina Peso (ARS): Argentina’s national currency 
Argentine national news agency (TELAM) 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR – Mercado Común del Sur) 
United States Dollar (USD)  
World Bank (WB) 
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Appendix 3: Data presented by the director of ANSeS during the Senate committees 
Source: Boudou 2008 
AFJPs’ fees: evolution September 1994-2008
 
Figure 3  
 
Private system’s funds - average annual return: monthly evolution 
 
Figure 4 
According to the explanation provided by the director of ANSeS, the figure shows how the fund 
return went negative due to the impact of the financial crisis. The data for September 2008 was -
10.07% (Senate plenary sessions Day 1 2008, 9) 
 
Total Fee 
AFJPs’ Fee 
Insurance premium 
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Private System’s return October 2008 – Contribution by type of investment  
 
100
 
Figure 5 
 
Value of the Private System between October 2007 and October 2008(in ARS) 
 
Figure 6 
                                                 
100
 The quota is the unit of unit of measurement of the accumulated funds. Each affiliate will have a certain 
number of quotas and the variation of its value is determined by the investments return.  
AS OF VALUE 
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Private system’s funds – Composition as of 23/10/2008 
 
Figure 7 
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Sustainability Guarantee Fund’s potential shareholding  
 
101
 
Figure 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
101
 The acronym S.A. refers to Sociedad Anónima which refers to a Limited Company  
COMPANY 
ANSeS’s potential 
shareholding 
Average 
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Argentine stock market: total traded shares vs. shares invested in by AFJPs 
   
Figure 9 
AFJPs had invested in only 39 out of the 86 Argentine listed shares, showing how the private 
system had not helped boost the local stock market (Senate plenary sessions Day 1, 8) 
 
 
Public Expenditure on Pensions as % of GDP 
 
Figure 10 
Amount of Argentine listed shares  
 
Amount invested in by AFJPs 
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Mixed Pension System’s Coverage 
 
Figure 11 
The director of ANSeS explained with this figure that the coverage after the pension system’s 
privatization the coverage had been declining. With the reforms performed in 2006 and 2007 
aimed to promote more inclusion, that trend changed (Senate plenary sessions Day 1 2008, 7) 
 
Benefits Provided by the Private System 
 
Figure 12 
Benefits provided by the funded tier 
(445.514 cases) 
Benefits not 
complemented 
by the State 
Benefits 
complemented by 
the State 
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Appendix 4: Data presented during the committees by G.J. Jáuregui 
Source: Jáuregui 2008 
 
Evolution of the Labour Force, Employed Population and the 
Covered/Contributing Population (Fully Funded System + PAYG): 1994-2007 
 
Figure 13 
 
 
Coverage Rate (Total Contributors/Labour Force): December 1994-2007 
 
Figure 14 
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Informal Employment Rate: 1990-2003 
 
Figure 15 
 
 
Evolution of the Amount of Contributors per tier: December 1994-2007 
 
Figure 16 
PAYG Fully funded 
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Evolution of Affiliates vs. Contributors to the Fully Funded tier: January 1995-
2008 – September 2008 
 
Figure 17  
 
Affiliates Contributors 
